Education Code section 44944, subdivision (a)1 prohibits the introduction of
evidence relating to matters occurring more than four years before a school district
files a notice of intention to dismiss a teacher. It also bars the dismissal of a
teacher for events occurring more than four years before the notice was
filed. We conclude, however, that the four-year period in section 44944,
subdivision (a) (section 44944(a)) is not absolute. Its bar may be evaluated in
the context of equitable estoppel when the basis of equitable relief is established.
I. FACTS
Albert Truitt was a credentialed teacher employed by the Atwater Elementary
School District (the district). On July 17, 2002, the district filed and served an
“Accusation and Notice of Dismissal and Charges” (notice of intent or notice)
pursuant to sections 44939 and 44944 and Government Code section 11503,
alleging that Truitt had engaged in sexual misconduct with five students
between 1992 and 1998. The district claimed that Truitt, who was also a
track coach, befriended young boys, encouraged their participation in
track and field, and used his position of trust to sexually abuse them. It
alleged that on numerous occasions, Truitt improperly massaged and
touched the buttocks and genitals of several male track participants. The
conduct occurred in Truitt’s home as well as on overnight trips when Truitt
shared accommodations with students. All of the incidents set out in the
district’s notice of intent involved boys who were students or former students of the
district.
Truitt denied the allegations and asserted affirmative defenses. The district then
filed an amended notice alleging he was dishonest and unfit for service. Truitt
again denied all charges raising the same defenses.
During subsequent administrative proceedings, Truitt moved to dismiss all
allegations based on incidents occurring more than four years before the district
served its notice of intent and to exclude any evidence relating to such incidents.
He relied on section 44944(a), which states in pertinent part: “No testimony shall
be given or evidence introduced relating to matters which occurred more than four
years prior to the date of the filing of the notice. Evidence of records regularly kept
by the governing board concerning the employee may be introduced, but no
decision relating to the dismissal or suspension of any employee shall be made
based on charges or evidence of any nature relating to matters occurring more
than four years prior to the filing of the notice.”
After the administrative law judge granted Truitt’s motions, the district sought a writ
of mandate to vacate the rulings. The trial court granted the petition and directed
the administrative law judge to enter new orders denying the motions. The Court of
Appeal reversed, holding that the section 44944(a) time limit is “absolute and
cannot be extended by the application of equitable doctrines such as delayed
discovery, fraudulent concealment, equitable estoppel, and continuing course of
conduct.”
II. DISCUSSION
Since we granted review the case has become moot. Truitt resigned his
teaching position, relinquished his teaching credential pursuant to a
criminal plea bargain, and subsequently died. However, it is undisputed
that this case involves a matter of statewide importance, so we have
retained it for decision. (State of California ex rel State Lands Com. v. Superior
Court (1995) 11 Cal.4th 50, 61.)
Under the Education Code, credentialed teachers may be disciplined by a local
school district or by the Commission on Teacher Credentialing (CTC). Regarding
grounds for termination by a school district, section 44932, subdivision (a)
provides, as applicable here: “No permanent employee shall be dismissed except
for one or more of the following causes: [¶] (1) Immoral or unprofessional conduct.
[¶] . . . [¶] (3) Dishonesty. [¶] . . . [¶] (5) Evident unfitness for service. . . .”
Procedures for a dismissal of a credentialed teacher are detailed in section 44944.2
The question here is whether section 44944(a)’s four-year limitation is
absolute or may be subject to equitable principles. The district argues
that the four-year time frame should be characterized as a statute of
limitations, subject to equitable principles. It urges that the Court of Appeal
incorrectly characterized subdivision (a) as an evidentiary bar or condition on a
substantive right. We conclude that the distinction is immaterial. The courts have
applied equitable principles to conditions on substantive rights as well as to
statutes of limitation (see, e.g., Estate of Caravas (1952) 40 Cal.2d 33, 42), and
“where actual or practical access to the courts is prevented the distinction between
so-called substantive and procedural statutes of limitations may be disregarded.”
(Myers v. Stevenson (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 399, 405.) As one commentator has
explained: “In some jurisdictions, circumstances or events that suspend the
running of a statute of limitations . . . do not delay the expiration of a right except as
provided in the statute creating the right. [Citations.] Other jurisdictions reject this
distinction as legalistic and unreasonable. [Citations.] [¶] California is definitely
committed to the second position.” (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure 4th (1997 supp.)
Actions, § 417, p. 525.) Thus, the characterization of section 44944(a)’s rule does
not resolve whether equitable principles apply. (3 Witkin, supra, § 417 at p. 526;
People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 709, 724.)
The district invites us to individually address several equitable doctrines.3 We
decline to do so because consideration of individual doctrines is unnecessary. A
conclusion that any one applies resolves whether the four-year time limitation is
absolute. In addition, the record does not facilitate consideration of individual
doctrines. Because of the procedural posture of this case, the parties have not
adequately set forth the factual basis on which various equitable principles would
rest. Accordingly, for the purposes of this case, we narrow our focus to the one
equitable doctrine that comes readily to mind in a section 44944(a) context:
equitable estoppel.
Our decision in Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363 (Lantzy) provides
guidance. There, we explained, “ ‘ “Equitable estoppel . . . comes into play only
after the limitations period has run and addresses . . . the circumstances in which a
party will be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to an
admittedly untimely action because his conduct has induced another into
forbearing suit within the applicable limitations period. [Equitable estoppel] is wholly
independent of the limitations period itself and takes its life . . . from the equitable
principle that no man [may] profit from his own wrongdoing in a court of justice.” ’
[Citations.]” (Lantzy, supra, at p. 383.) Because equitable estoppel is “wholly
independent” of section 44944(a)’s time limitation, it could be relied upon in some
circumstances to prevent a defendant from asserting the statutory bar. “To create
an equitable estoppel, ‘it is enough if the party has been induced to refrain from
using such means or taking such action as lay in his power, by which he might have
retrieved his position and saved himself from loss.’ ‘. . . Where the delay in
commencing action is induced by the conduct of the defendant it cannot be availed
of by him as a defense.’ ” (Benner v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 346,
349-350, italics and citation omitted.) Under this analysis, if the district were able to
meet the requirements of equitable estoppel, it could have been allowed to
introduce evidence of, and base its dismissal proceedings on, incidents falling
outside the four-year window.
We hold that equitable estoppel may apply to section 44944(a)’s four-year time
limitation. We express no opinion on whether the district could have satisfied the
doctrine’s requirements here. Nor need we decide whether other equitable
principles might apply. We simply conclude that the four-year time limitation is not
absolute.4 Our decision is also supported by the view that “courts should not
presume the Legislature intended ‘to overthrow long-established principles of law
unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by
necessary implication.’ [Citations.] The Legislature could have easily stated it
intended to abrogate long-established equitable principles [such as equitable
estoppel]. It did not do so.” (Juran v. Epstein (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 882, 896.)
In reaching a contrary result, the Court of Appeal referred to section 44242.7 which
applies to disciplinary actions brought by the CTC against a credentialed teacher.
Section 44242.7 expressly exempts allegations of sexual misconduct from the
requirement that allegations of wrongful acts be presented to the CTC within four
years from the date of the alleged act. It states, “Any allegation of an act or
omission by the holder of a credential, except for an allegation that involves sexual
misconduct with a minor or recurring conduct resulting in a pattern of misconduct,
shall be presented to the Committee of Credentials for initial review within four
years from the date of the alleged act or omission, or within one year from the date
the act or omission should reasonably have been discovered.” (§ 44242.7, italics
added.) Because the Legislature did not incorporate this exemption into local
district proceedings brought under section 44944, the Court of Appeal concluded
that its time limits were absolute.
The Court of Appeal also relied on the fact that, in 1993, the Legislature had an
opportunity to amend section 44944(a) and include language similar to the
section 44242.7 exemption. Senate Bill No. 941 would have “create[d] an
exception to the 4-year limitation in which evidence may be admitted
against a certificated employee, in a hearing to suspend or dismiss the
employee, in the case of allegations of childhood sexual abuse or
molestation as long as the time limits applicable in a civil action for
recovery of damages in a childhood sexual abuse case would otherwise
be met.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 941 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as
introduced Mar. 5, 1993.)5
The Legislature did not adopt Senate Bill No. 941. Although numerous
reasons might explain the Legislature’s inaction, the Court of Appeal
relied on the bill’s introduction as further support for its view that the
Legislature could have, but did not, include an exemption in section 44944
(a) similar to the exemption for sexual misconduct found in section 44242.7.
We disagree with the Court of Appeal’s analysis. By amending section 44242.7,
the Legislature created an express legal exception in the case of sexual misconduct
charges made in proceedings before the CTC. By refusing to include a similar
express exception in section 44944(a), the Legislature did not foreclose the
application of equitable principles to the time limits set out in that statute. Indeed,
the application of equity does not create an exception to the four-year time limit.
Generally, as a matter of law, the limit still applies. Equitable estoppel may apply in
a given case for particular reasons “wholly independent” of the general rule of
section 44944(a). Thus, the Legislature’s decision to include or omit such an
express legal exception does not signal an intent to bar the application of equitable
estoppel. It simply reflects a legislative disinclination to write a sweeping exception
into the statutory scheme as a matter of law.
The Court of Appeal’s analysis also creates an unacceptable anomaly. A
teacher could be prosecuted criminally, the CTC could institute credential
revocation proceedings, and a school district could be sued for negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision all based on the same set of facts that
exist here. Yet, the Court of Appeal’s literal interpretation of section 44944
(a) would deprive a school district of the ability to dismiss an employee on
the same set of facts. The district has no control over a prosecutor’s decision to
pursue criminal charges or over actions taken by the CTC. We decline to embrace
the Court of Appeal’s holding that a school district may be powerless to act against
a teacher accused of sexual misconduct, no matter how compelling the evidence,
unless and until the CTC acts or the teacher is criminally charged and prosecuted.
Such a result could not have been intended by the Legislature in light of the
different burdens of proof and procedures involved in those separate proceedings.6
We conclude the Legislature did not intend section 44944(a)’s time limitation to be
absolute. If the requirements of equitable estoppel had been established, they
could have applied in this case.
III. DISPOSITION
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed.
CORRIGAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J.
I dissent.
This case does not present an issue of whether disciplinary action may be taken
against a teacher for sexual misconduct that occurred more than four years before
an accusation of such misconduct was made. Rather, the question presented here
is whether the action may be taken by a school district or only by the Commission
on Teacher Credentialing (hereafter Commission). I would respect the Legislature’
s clear and unambiguously stated policy decision that such actions are to be taken
only by the Commission.
The Legislature has established two separate but interrelated systems for
addressing misconduct by a credentialed teacher. The first grants school boards
the authority to suspend or dismiss a teacher. (Ed. Code, § 44932 et seq.) The
second authorizes the Commission to admonish a teacher, to publicly reprove a
teacher, or to suspend or revoke a teacher’s credential. (Id., § 44242.5 et seq.)
The Legislature’s grant of authority to school boards to suspend or dismiss a
teacher is limited to matters occurring within four years of the filing of a notice of
charges. Education Code section 44944, subdivision (a)(5) so provides: “No
testimony shall be given or evidence introduced relating to matters which occurred
more than four years prior to the date of filing of the notice. . . . [N]o decision
relating to the dismissal or suspension of any employee shall be made based on
charges or evidence of any nature relating to matters occurring more than four
years prior to the filing of the notice.” (Italics added.)
The Legislature’s grant of authority to the Commission, however, is not so limited.
Education Code section 44242.7, subdivision (a) provides: “Any allegation of an
act or omission by the holder of a credential, except for an allegation that involves
sexual misconduct with a minor or recurring conduct resulting in a pattern of
misconduct, shall be presented to the [Commission’s] Committee of Credentials for
initial review within four years from the date of the alleged act or omission, or within
one year from the date the act or omission should reasonably have been
discovered.” (Italics added.) A school district, as the credentialed teacher’s
employer, is specifically authorized to present such allegations to the Commission.
(Ed. Code, § 44242.5, subd. (b)(3)(A), (4).)
The wording of these statutes is so clear and their meaning so plain that no
statutory construction is needed or warranted. As noted earlier, a school district’s
authority to impose professional discipline on a teacher based on evidence or
charges of any nature is limited to matters occurring more than four years before
the charges were initiated. The Commission may, however, take action as to any
allegation of sexual misconduct with a minor without any time limitation. (Ed. Code,
§ 44242.7, subd. (a); In re R.G. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1417.) The
conclusion that the Legislature made the Commission the exclusive forum for
disciplinary actions involving allegations of teacher sexual misconduct more than
four years old is unavoidable.
Also unavoidable is the conclusion that the Legislature’s decision was an
intentional, considered one and not the result of inadvertence. Senate Bill No. 941
was introduced in 1993 to amend Education Code section 44944, subdivision (a),
the statute governing school district actions, to create an exception to the four-year
limitation for cases involving allegations of sexual abuse or molestation of a minor.
(Stats. 1994, ch. 681, § 3, p. 3292.) But the Legislature never enacted Senate Bill
No. 941. Instead, it enacted Senate Bill No. 1843, a measure that added to the
Education Code section 44242.7, which exempts allegations of sexual misconduct
with a minor from the four-year limitation in Commission proceedings. (Sen. Bill No.
1843 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) § 3.) Thus, as the Court of Appeal correctly
observed: “The legislative materials show, in fact, that the lawmakers declined to
exempt allegations of sexual misconduct from section 44944’s prohibitions and,
instead, enacted provisions dealing with the topic in the credential revocation
scheme.”
The Legislature has made a decision and expressed that decision in clear and
unmistakable language. Whether the members of this court agree or disagree with
the Legislature’s decision is irrelevant. “The judiciary, in reviewing statutes
enacted by the Legislature, may not undertake to evaluate the wisdom of the
policies embodied in such legislation; absent a constitutional prohibition, the choice
among competing policy considerations in enacting laws is a legislative function.”
(Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 53.) Whatever the
applicability, scope, and efficacy of the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be in
cases not involving allegations of teacher sexual misconduct more than four years
old, in my view it may not be invoked to nullify a decision by the Legislature to vest
authority over such cases more than four years old in the Commission and not in
school districts.
The majority suggests that unless school districts are, contrary to the Legislature’s
decision, given authority to discipline a teacher for sexual misconduct with a minor
occurring more than four years before the notice of charges is filed, a school
district will be powerless, no matter how compelling the evidence, to take any action
against the teacher. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.) Not so. A school district that learns
of a teacher’s sexual misconduct with a minor more than four years earlier may
immediately suspend the teacher while it presents those charges to the
Commission. (Ed. Code, §§ 44242.5, subd. (a)(3)(A), 44939.) Moreover, the
Legislature could reasonably decide that the Commission’s power to suspend or
revoke a teaching credential is the most effective means of ensuring that the
teacher will be denied access to students in districts statewide who might otherwise
become potential molest victims.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
KENNARD, J.
Name of Opinion
Atwater Elementary School District v. Department of General Services
_______________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Review Granted XXX 116 Cal.App.4th 844
Rehearing Granted
_______________________________________________________
Opinion No. S124188
Date Filed: June 4, 2007
_______________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Merced
Judge: Betty L. Dawson
_______________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Driscoll & Associates and Thomas J. Driscoll, Jr., for Real Party in Interest and
Appellant.
John F. Kohn, Beverly Tucker, Rosalind D. Wolf, Robert E. Lindquist,
Brenda E. Sutton-Wills, Michael D. Hersh and Joseph R. Colton for
California Teachers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in
Interest and Appellant.
_______________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Lozano Smith, Michael E. Smith, Howard A. Friedman, Stephen A. Mendyk, Jesse J.
Maddox and Martha B. Scott for Plaintiff and Respondent.
John Bukey, Richard Hamilton and Judith Cias for The Education Legal Alliance of
the California School Boards Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff
and Respondent.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent. [Dept of General Services]
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Thomas J. Driscoll, Jr.
Driscoll & Associates
801 South Ham Lane, Suite H
Lodi, CA 95242
(209) 334-1935
Michael E. Smith
Lozano Smith
7404 N. Spalding Ave.
Fresno, CA 93720-3370
(559) 431-5600
Filed 6/4/07
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
ATWATER ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
GENERAL SERVICES
Defendant and Respondent,
ALBERT G. TRUITT, JR.,
Real Party in Interest
and Appellant.
_____________
)
)
)
)
) S124188)
)
)Ct.App. 5 F043009
)
)
)
)
) Merced County
) Super. Ct. No. 146534
)
)
)
CTA lawyers involved
in the Albert Truitt, Jr.
case:
Beverly Tucker,
Rosalind D. Wolf,
Michael D. Hersh
Robert E. Lindquist,
Brenda E. Sutton-Wills,
John F. Kohn
Joseph R. Colton
for
California Teachers
Association
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Real Party in Interest and
Appellant.
The school district attorneys
are really no better than the
CTA attorneys. See Lozano
Smith sanctions by federal
judge.
This decision can be found at http://www. courtinfo.ca.gov/ opinions/documents/S124188.DOC.
|
CTA calls itself a "Friend of the Court" in the Truitt case, but CTA often decides
NOT to be a friend to ethical and competent teachers--or to children. California
Teachers Association chief counsel Beverly Tucker spends teacher union dues going
to the California Supreme Court trying to keep a pedophile in the classroom.
BeverlyTucker and Carolyn Doggett, who together control CTA, have a history
of being on the wrong side of cases where the laws of California are violated
against teachers. When the friends of Beverly and Carolyn commit crimes, even
crimes against children, Tucker and Doggett will go out of their way to keep
criminals in the classroom.
Why did the
California
legislature fail to
approve an
exception to the
4-year statute of
limitations for
using child abuse
to fire teachers?
My guess:
Legislators were lobbied by
CTA, which threatened to
withhold campaign money
unless the legislature
protected teachers who
abuse children.
Democrat vows to
pass law despite the
teachers union
The teachers’ union kills a
Democratic bill to remove
criminals from CA classrooms
by STEPHEN FRANK
07/17/2012
Unions in California spent a
lot of money to assure
sexual perverts get to stay
in the classroom.
SB 1530 by a Democrat
would have made it easily to
get child molesters out of the
class (Why is this a
problem? Unions defend the
molesters against the safety
of the children)
“The state assembly,
however, is a stronghold for
the California Teachers
Association, which strongly
opposes SB 1530. Before
and during the hearings on
Padilla’s legislation in the
assembly education
committee, union leaders
and their confederates
launched a propaganda
effort against the bill,
deploying all their standard
talking points. The union
maintained that SB 1530
was nothing more than a
“teacher-bashing bill.” It
was too cumbersome, too
expensive, and would kill
due-process rights. It was
demoralizing and even “un-
American.” Though these
attacks were transparently
unfair, legislators got the
message. The bill needed six
“yeas” from the 11-member
committee to pass; it
received only five, with two
“nays” and four abstentions.”
Next time a kid gets
molested by a government
school teacher, I hope the
union is sued and arrested
as a co-conspirator. What
do you think?
Perverting Justice
The teachers’ union kills a
Democratic bill to remove
criminals from California’s
classrooms.
Larry Sand, City Journal,
7/16/12
Early this year, Los Angeles
police arrested Mark Berndt,
a longtime teacher at
Miramonte Elementary
School, on 23 counts of
committing lewd acts on
children between the ages of
seven and ten. The sickening
details of the crimes Berndt
is charged with committing
horrified the community and
the state. More stories about
California teachers accused
of sexual misconduct with
children have now surfaced.
The Berndt case casts new
light on the tortuous legal
process that makes it nearly
impossible for schools to rid
themselves of even these
depraved teachers.
Perversely, the case also
shows the extent to which
teachers’ unions will go to
protect their prerogatives.
As a result of Berndt’s
indictment, the Los Angeles
Unified School District asked
the state legislature to
change existing law to speed
up the process of removing
such teachers. State senator
Alex Padilla, a Los Angeles
Democrat and former L.A.
city councilman, wrote
Senate Bill 1530, which
would streamline the
labyrinthine “dismissal
statutes” that require
districts to navigate a
seemingly endless maze of
hearings and appeals.
Padilla’s bill was actually
quite narrow in scope,
dealing only with credible
claims that a teacher has
abused a child with sex,
drugs, or violence. Existing
law lets local school boards
immediately suspend a
teacher under “specified
conditions, including immoral
conduct.” Padilla’s bill
simply would add language
allowing a school board to
suspend an employee for
“serious or egregious
unprofessional conduct.”
Garnering strong bipartisan
support, Padilla’s bill sailed
through the state senate in
late May on a vote of 33 to 4.
The state assembly,
however, is a stronghold for
the California Teachers
Association, which strongly
opposes SB 1530. Before
and during the hearings on
Padilla’s legislation in the
assembly education
committee, union leaders
and their confederates
launched a propaganda
effort against the bill,
deploying all their standard
talking points. The union
maintained that SB 1530
was nothing more than a
“teacher-bashing bill.” It
was too cumbersome, too
expensive, and would kill
due-process rights. It was
demoralizing and even “un-
American.” Though these
attacks were transparently
unfair, legislators got the
message. The bill needed six
“yeas” from the 11-member
committee to pass; it
received only five, with two
“nays” and four abstentions.
Apparently none of the
committee Democrats had
the sense to ask how
protecting children from
pedophiles amounts to
“teacher-bashing.” The
union’s charge that the bill is
“cumbersome” was equally
bewildering. In fact, Padilla’
s legislation would curtail
the number of steps required
to fire a criminal teacher.
The current system is so
unwieldy that it discourages
administrators from taking
action against all but the
most egregious miscreants.
The claim that Padilla’s bill
would cost districts more
money is even loopier. “In
the past decade,” reported
Beth Barrett at the L.A.
Weekly in 2010, “LAUSD
officials spent $3.5 million
trying to fire just seven of
the district’s 33,000
teachers for poor classroom
performance—and only four
were fired, during legal
struggles that wore on, on
average, for five years each.
Two of the three others
were paid large settlements,
and one was reinstated. The
average cost of each battle
is $500,000.”
The high cost of firing
teachers helps explain why
the Los Angeles Unified
School District simply paid
Berndt a $40,000 severance
rather than undertake the
formal dismissal process,
even though he’s accused of
the most despicable crimes
against children. If the
indicted ex-teacher had
decided to pursue his legal
options under current state
law, odds are that the
district would have paid a
great deal more than the
five-figure sum that bought
Berndt’s resignation. That’s
what makes the union’s
claim that SB 1530 would
“kill due process” so
outrageous—what California
has now is effectively
“undue process.” But when
LAUSD school board
president Monica Garcia
testified before the assembly
education committee last
month, she assured
legislators that Padilla’s bill
protects due process “by
allowing a teacher to
present his/her defense, to
be represented by counsel,
to require disclosure and to
present witnesses. The
teacher would also be able
to request a hearing by an
independent arbiter.” Even
in the event of a false claim,
no teacher would lose his
job simply by being accused.
What more protection could
they want?
The CTA’s real objection to
SB 1530 concerned
significant changes to the
Commission on Professional
Competence, which is
perhaps the most egregious
aspect of the current
dismissal process. The three-
member panel consists of an
administrative law judge and
two union-sponsored
teachers, and it has the final
say on whether a teacher
stays or goes. A CPC review
can consume a year or more,
all while the teacher under
scrutiny remains on the
payroll and adds to his
pension fund. SB 1530
would have eliminated the
two teachers from the panel
and made the administrative
law judge’s role advisory.
The judge would still hear
testimony, but he would
deliver his opinion to the
school board, which would
then render the decision.
(Incidentally, the bill would
also deny pension benefits to
any public employee
convicted of sex abuse
involving a minor.)
Teachers’ unions are nothing
if not predictable. Their
mandate is to represent all
teachers, even lousy ones—
and even a few criminals.
After all, the union collects,
on average, more than
$1,000 per year from every
teacher in the state—good or
bad, upstanding or felonious.
Any threat to the union’s
hegemony, even one as
narrowly tailored as Padilla’
s, will be met with maximum
resistance.
But what is the assembly
Democrats’ excuse? In a
state where pedophiles aren’
t allowed to live near a
school, these legislators don’
t seem to have a problem
with them teaching in one.
While claiming to be
sympathetic to the problem,
several members said SB
1530 was not quite the right
bill, and they also objected
to the CPC reforms.
Former state senator Gloria
Romero isn’t buying the
assembly committee’s
excuses. Romero, now
California director of
Democrats for Education
Reform, had especially harsh
words for the four
abstainers—South Bay
Democrat Betsy Butler,
Rialto Democrat Wilmer
Amina Carter, Monterey Park
Democrat Mike Eng, and
Santa Barbara Democrat Das
Williams. “This is how bills
die,” Romero told me.
“Death by silence.” She
added that the abstainers
are “cowering in fear” and
remaining silent because
they’re afraid to run afoul of
the “moneyed political
interests”—the teachers’
unions. No wonder CTA
considers the state assembly
“their house.”
Though disappointed, Alex
Padilla remains undeterred
and vows to get some
version of the bill passed.
But first he must convince
his fellow legislators to
develop a conscience, stand
up to the special interests,
and remember who they’re
supposed to represent:
taxpayers, parents, and
children.
Why did CTA fight to keep the following anomaly in California
law?
"A teacher could be prosecuted criminally, the CTC could institute
credential revocation proceedings, and a school district could be sued for
negligent hiring, retention, and supervision all based on the same
set of facts that exist here.
"Yet, the Court ... would deprive a school district of the
ability to dismiss an employee on the same set of facts."
If CTA were to defend all teachers equally, there would be less reason to
criticize. Instead, CTA frequently helps child molesting teachers far beyond
what is required by its contract with members.
What's the motive?
Politics.
CTA makes decisions based on politics and personal loyalties, and thus
defends incompetent and criminal teachers while at the same time violating
the law and the contract against competent, law-abiding teachers.
To CTA, keeping power in the right hands is the first order of business.
June 2007: The Albert G. Truitt Case
A Troubling Pattern of Hiding and/or Defending
Abuse of Children
California Teachers Association
Local Teacher Still
Employed Despite
Misconduct Claims
Promise Charter School
Teacher Jose Valencia
Suspected Of Inappropriate
Behavior
May 17, 2011
SAN DIEGO -- Parents,
students and teachers are
coming forward and talking to
10News about a San Diego
school teacher's alleged
misconduct around his
students.
Witnesses told 10News they
have seen incidents in which
Promise Charter School
teacher Jose Valencia acted
in an inappropriately around
students.
"He was up on the courtyard
with two little girls around him
and both of them were
playing with his hair," said
parent Sandra Ruiz, whose
child was on a soccer team
coached by Valencia.
[Maura Larkins comment: I
don't see a problem with
allowing girls to play with
hair. It's a very common
behavior among girls.
They will often
spontaneously braid the
hair of a girl sitting in
front of them. But it
sounds like there were
other, more troubling
behaviors by this
teacher. For comparison,
I once was startled to see
a young girl sitting on the
lap of a teacher at a
school in Chula Vista. I
said to my friend, "Is that
his daughter?" My friend
said "no." I also saw this
same teacher take a boy's
skull in his hand and
shove the boy backward
across the cafeteria.
When the principal put
pressure on this teacher
to change his ways, the
staff, supported by
current CTA co-director
Jim Groth, went after the
teacher with a
vengeance. The teachers
were successful in
getting the principal fired.]
Former Promise Charter
School counselor Erick
Cordero told 10News, "I
noticed the teacher on the
ground with his legs crossed,
girls surrounding him and
playing with his hair."
When asked if he was ever
inappropriate with a student,
Valencia told 10News,
"Never."
A former student of
Valencia's told 10News about
an incident she witnessed
when another girl asked
Valencia a question in class.
"She wanted to know what a
word meant in the book and
she asked the teacher and
he started laying [sic] down
on the bean bag and she laid
down, too," the former
student said.
The former student said the
book was "Chicken Soup for
the Lover's Soul."
A former principal said in
court documents that she
was fired for cooperating
with a police investigation
into four separate complaints
"concerning Mr. Valencia's
inappropriate behavior with
female students."
A police investigation into
one of the complaints was
never finished because,
according to court records,
"(the alleged) victim was not
able to compose herself to
answer questions."
Valencia has never been
charged with a crime.
Two of his former students
told 10News he asked them
not to talk about what
happened in class.
"He says, 'What if they fire
me?' What would happen to
his wife and kids and stuff
like that," one former student
said.
"He just stared at me and
said, 'If anything happens to
me, if I ever go to jail, just
think about my wife and
future kids," another former
student said.
When initially asked if he had
any idea about the
accusations being made
against him, Valencia said,
"Not really."
10News learned Valencia
does have knowledge about
complaints against him. He
has responded to them in
writing: "How was I supposed
to know that sitting next to a
girl student ... is
inappropriate?" and "How
was I supposed to know that
if a student ... fixes my hair
it's inappropriate?"
Valencia is a member of the
San Diego Education
Association, and when asked
for a comment on this story,
the vice president of that
teacher's union told 10News
reporter Mitch Blacher, "I'm
recommending to Jose, in
terms of protecting himself
from predators like his
principal and you, to not talk."
"I'm kind of shocked that the
union is protecting teachers
like that," Promise Charter
School Principal Jose Orozco
said.
Orozco said his school board
hasn't been able to fire
Valencia because of union
protection. He told 10News
past similar complaints were
made about a teacher who
wasn't a union member and
he was let go.
Orozco said an assistant is
now always in Valencia's
classroom to observe.
Orozco told 10News
inappropriate behavior on
school property has stopped.
San Diego Education Report
|
San Diego
Education Report
CTA is shockingly
predictable in its
protection of child
molesters
In the Fred Kamper case,
the teachers union even
helped get Kamper elected
to the school board, but
parent demonstrations
caused him to resign.
Also, see my recent story,
"Were CVESD and Chula
Vista Educators negligent in
Kinloch child molestation
case?" I suspect we'll be
hearing a lot more about
the John Raymond Kinloch
case in the coming years.
Moraga teacher kept job
for two years after
allegations of
inappropriate touching
of third-graders
By Matthias Gafni
Contra Costa Times
01/26/2013
The Moraga School District
learned firsthand how
difficult firing a tenured
teacher can be.
It took 17 months to fire
former third-grade teacher
Charles Bateman even
though an administrative
panel ruled he should be
terminated for "immoral
conduct" and "evident
unfitness for service" after it
found he touched six girls
under their clothing in his
classroom in 1993. It took
six years before he lost his
teaching credential.
Two decades later, the
statutory due process laws
in California remain largely
unchanged.
Bateman was a teacher for
23 years, his final seven at
Rheem Elementary School
in Moraga. The once
popular teacher, now 69
and living in Brentwood,
according to public records,
taught third grade in the
1992-93 school year.
On Feb. 23, 1993, two
parents of girls in his class
came forward to Principal
Paul Ricciardi after reading
of the abuse in a victim's
diary. In the end, six girls
came forward with most
claiming Bateman reached
under their shirts to rub
their back, stomach and
chest areas, and sometimes
under the girl's pants
waistbands, according to
court documents.
Ricciardi appropriately
performed his legal
"mandated reporting" duties
that day and contacted
Child Protective Services
and Moraga police and
Bateman was immediately
placed on administrative
leave.
The school board voted the
next month to fire him, but
Bateman appealed. In
September 1993, all six girls
testified at a hearing at
Joaquin Moraga
Intermediate School before
a three-person Commission
on Professional
Competence panel.
Bateman was paid his full
salary during the
investigation and the
California Teachers
Association paid his legal
bills.
Bateman's defense during
the administrative hearings
was that he was an
affectionate hugger and
that any inappropriate
touching was
unintentional.
Testimony during the
hearing also brought out
more troubling realizations
about retired school
administrator Bill Walters,
who served as principal of
Joaquin Moraga middle
school when Bateman
taught there. Walters was
also entangled in the
district's 1990s child sex
abuse scandal when he
failed to perform his legal
mandated reporting duties
after learning of another
teacher accused of abusing
students. This failing, critics
say, helped lead to further
abuse.
In a 1986 teacher
evaluation by Walters, he
writes about Bateman: "It is
imperative that Chuck
use extreme caution with
his physical interactions
with students so as not to
be misinterpreted by the
community and the district."
The review referenced a
letter sent to Walters from a
parent that stated Bateman
"engaged in more physical
interaction with the girls in
his classes than he did with
the boys," according to
documents released after a
public records act request
by this newspaper.
Rheem Principal Ricciardi
also "cautioned" Bateman
on occasions before 1993
"that he should be careful to
avoid physical interaction
with students, which could
be interpreted as being
inappropriate," according to
commission records.
The administrative appeal
ended with the commission
voting unanimously to
terminate Bateman;
however, he petitioned
Contra Costa Superior
Court to overturn the
decision. Bateman's
attorney was Priscilla
Winslow, who now is
acting chief counsel for the
California Teachers
Association, running the
union's legal services
division. She did not return
a call for comment, nor did
Bateman.
Bateman lost his appeal,
but he continued to fight the
state to keep his credential.
It's unclear if he ever taught
at another district during his
fight while his credential was
still valid.
Bateman was never
charged with a crime.