casesPriscillaWinslowCTAheadcounsel

1.        Sunnyvale Unified School Dist. v. Jacobs, H031721, COURT
OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, 171 Cal.
App. 4th 168; 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 546; 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 178; 186 L.R.
R.M. 2116, February 18, 2009, Filed, Request denied by Sunnyvale
Unified School District v. Jacobs (Michael), 2009 Cal. LEXIS 6602 (Cal.,
June 10, 2009)
Priscilla Winslow for Plaintiff and Appellant, for Defendants and ...

Warning: Negative treatment is indicated. Click to Shepardize®

2.        San Leandro Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of San Leandro
Unified School Dist., A114679 & A115686, COURT OF APPEAL OF
CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE, 154 Cal.
App. 4th 866; 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 288; 2007 Cal. App. LEXIS 1415; 185 L.R.
R.M. 2058, August 28, 2007, Filed,

NOT CITABLE—SUPERSEDED BY GRANT OF REVIEW , Review
granted, Depublished by San Leandro Teachers Association v.
Governing Board of the San Leandro Unified School, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d
528, 171 P.3d 545, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 13320 (Cal., 2007)Later proceeding
at San Leandro Teachers Association v. Governing Board of the San
Leandro Unified School District, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 14356 (Cal., Dec. 14,
2007)Later proceeding at San Leandro Teachers Association v.
Governing Board of the San Leandro Unified, 2008 Cal. LEXIS 2078
(Cal., Feb. 14, 2008)Application granted by San Leandro Teachers
Association v. Governing Board of the San Leandro Unified School
District, 2008 Cal. LEXIS 6218 (Cal., May 22, 2008)Application granted
by San Leandro Teachers Association et al. v. Governing Board of the
San Leandro Unified School District et al., 2008 Cal. LEXIS 6232 (Cal.,
May 22, 2008)Request granted, Request denied by San Leandro
Teachers Association v. Governing Board of the San Leandro Unified
School District, 2009 Cal. LEXIS 4580 (Cal., Apr. 24, 2009)Later
proceeding at San Leandro Teachers Association v. Governing Board of
the San Leandro Unified School District, 2009 Cal. LEXIS 5191 (Cal.,
May 5, 2009)Affirmed by, Superseded by San Leandro Teachers Ass'n
v. Governing Bd. of the San Leandro Unified Sch. Dist., 2009 Cal. LEXIS
5417 (Cal., June 18, 2009)
... and Appellants.California Teachers Association, Priscilla S. Winslow,
Beverly Tucker, Ballinger G. Kemp and Ramon ...
Positive treatment is indicated. Click to Shepardize®

3.        California Teachers Assn. v. Public Employment Relations
Bd., G040106, COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1076; 87
Cal. Rptr. 3d 530; 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 2; 185 L.R.R.M. 2805, January
5, 2009, Filed, Review denied by, Request denied by California
Teachers Association v. Public Employment Relations Board, 2009 Cal.
LEXIS 3848 (Cal., Apr. 15, 2009)
Rosalind Wolf; Joseph R. Colton and Priscilla Winslow for
Petitioner.Tami R. Bogert, General Counsel, ...
Citing Refs. With Analysis Available. Click to Shepardize®

4.        Adair v. Stockton Unified School Dist., C054294, COURT OF
APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT, 162 Cal. App.
4th 1436; 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 62; 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 747, May 19, 2008,
Filed, Writ denied by, Request denied by Adair (George W.) v. Stockton
Unified School District, 2008 Cal. LEXIS 9799 (Cal., Aug. 13, 2008)
... California Teachers' Assn. v. Parlier Unified School Dist. (1984) 157
Cal. App. 3d 174, 183 & fn. 6 [204 Cal. Rptr. 20]; Winslow v. San Diego
Community College Dist. (1979) 97 Cal. App. 3d 30, 38–39 [158 Cal.
Rptr. 509] ...

Link to search of California Court of Appeal

Priscilla Winslow, attorney
PERB board member
California Teachers Association

CALIFORNIA SCHOOL
BOARDS
ASSOCIATION et al.,
Petitioners and
Appellants,
v.
STATE BOARD OF
EDUCATION,
Respondent;
ASPIRE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, INC.,
Real Party in Interest and
Respondent.

No. A122485.
Court of Appeals of California, First
District, Division Four.
Filed July 26, 2010.
Certified for Publication

Deborah B. Caplan, N. Eugene Hill,
Richard C. Miadich, Olson, Hagel &
Fishburn, LLP,
Joseph R. Colton,
Priscilla Winslow,
Attorney for Appellants California
School Boards Association,
Association of California School
Administrators, Stockton Unified
School District, California Teachers'
Association.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., California
Attorney General, Susan M. Carson,
Supervising Deputy Attorney General,
Benjamin J. Riley, Deputy Attorney
General, Paul C. Minney, Andrew G.
Minney, Middleton, Young & Minney,
LLP., Attorney for Respondents
California State Board of
Education, Aspire Public
Schools, Inc.

RIVERA, J.

Charter schools are public
schools that operate
independently from, but with
oversight by, the school districts or
county boards of education that
approve their charters. Before 2002,
charter schools operated without
geographic restrictions; a school
chartered in Los Angeles could
operate "satellite" campuses as far
away as Palo Alto or Mendocino.[ 1 ]
In 2002, after it came to light that a
school chartered in Fresno but
operating satellites in far-flung
locations had accumulated $1.3
million in debt and was involved in
other irregularities,[ 2 ] the
Legislature amended the Charter
Schools Act of 1992 (Ed. Code,[ 3 ] §
47600 et seq.) (CSA) to require that
charter schools be located within the
districts or counties where they are
chartered (see, e.g., §§ 47605, subd.
(a)(1), 47605.1). The Legislature
also added section 47605.8.
Subdivision (a) authorized the State
Board of Education (the State Board)
to approve statewide charters that
would allow a school to operate
without the geographic restrictions.
Subdivision (b), however, provided
that the State Board could not
approve a statewide charter unless it
first made a finding that "the
proposed state charter school will
provide instructional services of
statewide benefit that cannot be
provided by a charter school
operating in only one school district,
or only in one county."

In 2007 the State Board approved a
statewide charter for Aspire Public
Schools, Inc. (Aspire). The California
School Boards Association (CSBA)
and others filed an action
challenging this approval,
contending that the State Board
failed to determine and make a
finding that Aspire's instructional
services of a statewide benefit could
not be provided through individual
charters from local school districts.
The State Board and Aspire
demurred. They contended, and the
trial court ruled, that section 47605.8,
subdivision (b) requires the State
Board to find the proposed charter
school will provide "instructional
services of statewide benefit," but
does not require the Board to find, in
addition, that the statewide benefit
could not be provided through locally
approved charters. We conclude that
such a finding is required and,
accordingly, we reverse.

The petition and complaint contains
two other causes of action seeking
mandamus. Petitioners allege: (1)
the State Board has failed and
refused to enforce the conditions of
approval imposed on Aspire's
charter and should be compelled to
do so; and (2) the State Board used
policies and procedures in
connection with its consideration of
statewide charter petitions that have
not been adopted in accordance with
the Administrative Procedure Act
(Gov. Code, § 11340 et seq.) (APA)
and, therefore, the State Board
should be compelled to set aside its
approval of Aspire's charter. The trial
court sustained demurrers to these
causes of action. We reverse as to
these claims as well.

I. PARTIES TO THE ACTION

CSBA, the California Teachers'
Association, the Association of
California School Administrators,
and the Stockton Unified School
District (SUSD) (collectively
referred to as petitioners) sued the
State Board as
respondent/defendant and Aspire
as real party in interest, seeking a
writ of mandate and injunctive and
declaratory relief. The State Board
and Aspire will be referred to
collectively as respondents...

The 2002 amendments provided
that, from and after July 1, 2002, a
school chartered by a district must
identify a "single charter school that
will operate within the geographic
boundaries of that school district."
(§§ 47605, subd. (a)(1), 47605.1,
subd. (a)(1).)...

3. The Parties' Contentions

At the heart of petitioners' claim is the
interpretation of this statutory
provision: "The [State Board] may not
approve a petition for the operation of
a state charter school under this
section unless [it] finds that the
proposed state charter school will
provide instructional services of
statewide benefit that cannot be
provided by a charter school
operating in only one school district,
or only in one county." (§ 47605.8,
subd. (b).)..

According to respondents: The State
Board must find that the proposed
charter school will provide
"instructional services of statewide
benefit," and that it cannot provide
that benefit "through a charter that
only allows the [applicant] to operate
in one location." (Italics added.) In
other words, the State Board must
find that "the instructional services
the [applicant] proposes will offer a
statewide benefit that would be
frustrated if the petitioner was only
allowed to open a school in one
county or [in one] district."

We note, parenthetically, that this
was not respondents' position in the
trial court. There, they argued that the
State Board's "only legal obligation
under section 47605.8 was to make
a finding that Aspire would provide a
statewide benefit prior to approving
the charter." They contended the
statute did not require the State
Board to "explain why Aspire could
not instead operate each of its
schools under individual charters
approved by local school districts."

At oral argument respondents'
counsel sought to clarify this
apparent inconsistency, explaining
that it was respondents' intent to
make the same argument on appeal
as was made below. In either event,
we conclude respondents'
construction of the statute is
insupportable.
4. Statutory Language
a. Operating in Only One School
District or in Only One County

The statute is not a model of clarity.
The phrase "that cannot be provided
by a charter school operating in only
one school district, or only in one
county" is, on its face, conducive to
the kind of literal construction
respondents espouse, i.e., a finding
that "the [applicant] will provide a
statewide benefit that cannot be
achieved through a charter that only
allows the [applicant] to operate in
one location." (Italics added.) But this
interpretation necessarily presumes
that a charter school entity can be
restricted to operating in "only . . . one
location." As has been noted, the
CSA neither prohibits nor
discourages a charter school from
operating in multiple school districts
under local charters. Indeed, as of
2005 Aspire itself was operating 17
schools around the state, chartered
by seven different school districts.
We therefore reject this interpretation
of the statute as being inconsistent
with the statutory scheme.

Although the terminology is awkward,
we agree with petitioners that the
phrase "operating in only one school
district, or only in one county" (§
47605.8, subd. (b)) refers to each
school proposed under the
statewide charter. In other words,
approval of a statewide charter
petition would require a finding that
the school's "instructional services of
statewide benefit" (ibid.) cannot be
provided if the proposed schools (e.
g., one located in the LAUSD, one in
the San Francisco Unified School
District, and one in the SUSD) were
operated under charters from those
districts.[ 13 ] This interpretation of
the phrase, unlike respondents'
interpretation, is consistent with
other provisions of the CSA. It also
makes practical sense because the
statute contemplates that a
statewide charter will operate in
"multiple sites throughout the state."
(§ 47605.8, subd. (a).) It follows that
the law would require the State
Board to make a finding as to
whether the applicant could achieve
that same statewide benefit
operating each of its proposed
schools under local district or county
charters.
b. The Finding Requirement of
Section 47605.8, Subdivision (b)

At oral argument respondents
argued, as they did below, that the
statute requires the State Board to
make only one finding—that the
applicant's instructional services will
provide a statewide benefit—and
does not require the State Board to
make an additional finding that the
statewide benefit cannot be provided
if the school operated under local
charters. Respondents' reasoning is
this: "instructional services of
statewide benefit that cannot be
provided by a charter school
operating [under local charters]" is a
single finding, not a dual one, that is,
section 47605.8, subdivision (b)
defines "instructional services of
statewide benefit" as a benefit that
"cannot be provided by a charter
school operating [under local
charters]"; therefore, once a
"statewide benefit" has been found
the statute's requirements have been
satisfied.

We see nothing in the statute's plain
language, in the statutory scheme of
the CSA, or in the legislative history
of section 47605.8 that suggests this
was what the Legislature intended. If
the lawmakers intended to define
statewide benefit as a "benefit that
cannot be provided by a charter
school operating [in local districts]"
then presumably they would have so
stated. Instead the Legislature
provided that a statewide charter
could not be approved unless the
State Board "finds that the proposed
state charter school will provide
instructional services of statewide
benefit that cannot be provided by a
charter school operating [under local
charters]." (Italics added.) The plain
meaning of these words invokes a
two-step analysis.

Additionally, respondents provide us
with nothing in the statute, the CSA,
or the legislative history that would
support a conclusion that statewide
benefits cannot be achieved under a
series of local charters. In fact,
respondents have conceded that
Aspire's statewide instructional
program could possibly (though not
likely) be achieved through a series
of local charters. If this is so, then the
statute cannot mean what
respondents say it means—that a
"statewide benefit" is, by definition, a
benefit that cannot be achieved
under local charters.[ 14 ]

In sum, we conclude the plain
language of the statute requires the
State Board to find, before approving
a statewide charter, that the
applicant's instructional services will
provide a statewide benefit, and that
the benefit is one that cannot be
provided under local charters. This
interpretation is also reinforced by
the statutory scheme, the structure of
which reflects a preference for locally
chartered schools.
5. Statutory Scheme

Section 47605 governs the approval
of district charters. It provides that
local school districts, in reviewing
charter petitions, "shall be guided by
the intent of the Legislature that
charter schools are and should
become an integral part of the
California educational system and
that establishment of charter schools
should be encouraged." (§ 47605,
subd. (b).) Local school districts are
therefore mandated to approve
charters that meet statutory
requirements and are consistent
with sound educational practices.
(Ibid. ["shall grant a charter for the
operation of a school . . .," italics
added].) Denial of a charter is not
permitted except upon the issuance
of "written factual findings, specific to
the particular petition, setting forth
specific facts to support one or more
of the [statutorily enumerated]
findings." (Ibid.)

The legislative policy with respect to
statewide charters is the mirror
image of the policy regarding district
charters. Section 47605.8,
subdivision (b) prohibits the approval
of a statewide charter petition unless
specific findings can be made ("[t]he
[State Board] may not approve a
petition . . . unless . . .," italics
added). Noticeably absent from the
statute is any language requiring the
State Board to be guided by the
legislative intent that establishment
of statewide charter schools should
be encouraged. And, in contrast to
provisions strictly limiting the
grounds for the denial of a district
charter, the State Board is never
required to approve a statewide
charter petition, and may deny the
petition on any ground which the
State Board finds to be justified. (Id.,
subd. (d), incorporating by reference
§ 47605.6, subd. (b); see also §
47605.6, subd. (b)(6).)[ 15 ]

Despite the Legislature's distinctly
different approaches to district and
statewide charters, respondents
categorically reject the notion that the
CSA expresses a preference for local
charters because, as they argue, "the
substantive requirements for charter
school approval are the same for
local and state charter schools."
(Italics added.) The fact that all
charter schools must satisfy uniform
standards is neither surprising nor
relevant. The critical question in this
matter is whether the CSA is
designed to encourage local
chartering. That question is not
affected by the substantive
requirements for charter schools.

We also reject respondents'
characterization of section 47605.8
as "an indisputable legislative
mandate to the [State] Board to
authorize state charter schools that
may operate without geographic or
site limitations," as well as their
contention at oral argument that the
authorization of statewide charters
was one of the primary objectives of
the 2002 amendments. It seems to
us unlikely that the Legislature would
use proscriptive terms ("may not
approve [a statewide charter] unless
. . .") to declare a mandate. (§
47605.8, subd. (b).) Additionally, the
notion that the statute constitutes a
"mandate" runs contrary to the
legislative history which shows that
the primary impetus behind the 2002
amendments was to tighten
oversight of charter schools by, inter
alia, prohibiting the establishment of
schools that would operate in
locations geographically distant from
their chartering agencies.[ 16 ] (Sen.
Education Analysis of Assem. Bill
No. 1994, supra, p. 2.)

This statutory scheme, we conclude,
reflects an intent to promote district
chartered schools and local
oversight while allowing for limited
exceptions. Section 47605.8 is one
such exception, permitting the
establishment of a charter school
with no geographic restrictions only if
it offers instructional services of a
statewide benefit and only if that
benefit would be frustrated if it
operated its schools under district
(or county) charters.
6. Respondents' Other Contentions

Respondents point to the regulation
adopted by the State Board that
requires statewide charter applicants
to "[d]emonstrate success in
operating charter schools previously
approved in California." (Regs., §
11967.6, subd. (a)(7).) This
regulation, respondents argue,
negates the notion that the CSA
favors local charters because this
would place statewide charter
applicants in a Catch-22—"although
the regulations require that they
demonstrate success in operating
previously approved charter schools,
that same success would . . .
constitute a valid reason to deny
such petitioners."

We think respondents' argument
gives undue weight to this section of
the regulation. But that is of no
moment. Whatever bearing the
regulation may have on the approval
or denial of a statewide charter, it
cannot control the statute's meaning.
The scope or intent of a statute
cannot be diminished or altered by a
regulation purporting to interpret or
implement it. (Morris v. Williams
(1967) 67 Cal.2d 733, 748
[regulation cannot alter or amend a
statute or enlarge or impair its
scope].)

Respondents assert as "obvious"
the proposition that section 47605.8
was adopted to "provide[] a
mechanism for charter school
operators to avoid the patchwork quilt
of local school district approval. If
plaintiffs had their way," respondents
argue, "Aspire would be required to
open each and every campus
pursuant to different local chartering
agencies, each with their own unique
approval processes, oversight
mechanisms, academic reporting
requirements, special-education
arrangements, and admission
preferences—thus eliminating the
uniform, statewide nature of Aspire's
educational program." (Italics
omitted.)

First, as we have already noted, the
2002 amendments were specifically
designed to encourage locally
chartered schools and to impose
geographic restrictions on charter
school operations that would help to
"clarify a district's sovereignty over
public education provided within its
boundaries and to enhance
oversight of charter schools." (Sen.
Finance Analysis of Assem. Bill No.
1994, supra, p. 1.) Having chosen to
impose such restrictions, it would
make no sense for the Legislature to
simultaneously create "a
mechanism for charter school
operators to avoid . . . local school
district approval." We read section
47605.8 as an exception to the CSA's
chartering scheme, not as an equally
available option for establishing a
charter school...

Respondents assert that the ACCS
simply "applied the formally adopted
regulations" when it "analyzed
Aspire's petition."

Respondents, however, do not cite to
anything in the record that would
support this assertion.[ 25 ] Our own
review of the record has uncovered
nothing that describes the "`policies,
procedures, standards, criteria,
regulations and evaluation
instruments'" (Engelmann, supra, 2
Cal.App.4th at p. 62) used by the
ACCS to "implement, interpret, or
make specific" (Gov. Code, §
11342.600) section 47605.8 when it
analyzed Aspire's petition and made
its recommendation...l

Additionally, the record does not
support respondents'
characterization of the ACCS's action
as being limited to making a
recommendation that applied
statutory and regulatory criteria to
Aspire's petition. It appears, rather,
that the ACCS took a far more hands-
on approach. There is evidence that
the chair of the ACCS reviewed a
draft of Aspire's charter petition and
sent a detailed e-mail to the CEO of
Aspire advising him on how the
petition could be improved...

Petitioners have alleged that they are
directly affected by the approval of
statewide charter schools and have
an interest in ensuring their
legitimacy. These allegations are
sufficient to overcome the State
Board's contention on demurrer that
the policies and procedures
governing the ACCS's review of and
recommendations on statewide
charters are merely matters of
internal management.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION

The demurrers to the first three
causes of action should not have
been sustained. Accordingly, we
reverse as to those causes of action
and also as to the fourth and fifth
causes of action seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief predicated on
the same allegations.

The judgment is reversed and the
cause is remanded.

We concur:

RUVOLO, P.J.

SEPULVEDA, J.

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GOVERNOR BROWN ANNOUNCES APPOINTMENTS
2-1-2013
CA..gov

SACRAMENTO – Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. today announced the following appointments.

...Priscilla Winslow, 60, of Berkeley, has been appointed to the California
Public Employment Relations Board, where she has served as legal
advisor since 2012.

She was assistant chief counsel at the California Teachers Association from 1996 to 2012. Winslow
was managing partner at the Law Offices of Winslow and Fassler from 1988 to 1996 and was solo
practitioner at the Law Offices of Priscilla Winslow from 1986 to 1988. She was an adjunct professor
at New College of California from 1984 to 1993 and was associate attorney at Boltuch and Siegel
from 1984 to 1986.

Winslow served as a temporary staff attorney at the California Teachers Association from 1983 to
1984 and was legal advisor to the chair of the California Public Employment Relations Board from
1979 to 1983. She was staff counsel for the National Treasury Employees Union from 1978 to 1979
and chief counsel for the Clerical and Allied Services Employees Union from 1977 to 1978. Winslow
is a member of the American Constitution Society and the Labor and Employment Law Section of the
State Bar.

She earned a Juris Doctorate degree from the University of California, Davis School of Law. This
position requires Senate confirmation and the compensation is $128,109. Winslow is a Democrat.

...Eric Banks, 41, of San Diego, has been appointed to the California Public Employment Relations
Board. Banks has been partner at TenPageMemo LLC since 2013. He served in multiple positions at
the Service Employees International Union, Local 221 from 2001 to 2013, including advisor, president
and director of government and community relations. Banks was policy associate for state
government affairs at the New York AIDS Coalition from 2000 to 2001. He worked in multiple positions
at the Southern Tier AIDS Program from 1993 to 2000, including director of client services, assistant
director of client services and case manager. This position requires Senate confirmation and the
compensation is $128,109. Banks is a Democrat...

Priscilla Winslow seems to have pushed Emma
Leheny to quit as CTA chief counsel in 2012

Priscilla Sue Winslow -
#78609

Current Status:   Active

The following information is
from the official records of
The State Bar of California.

Bar Number:
78609
Address:         1440
Keoncrest Dr
Berkeley, CA 94702
pwinslow@cta.org
County:        Alameda
Undergraduate
School:         Univ of
California Santa Cruz; CA

Sections:        Labor &
Employment

Law School:        UC Davis
SOL King Hall; Davis CA

12/21/1977        Admitted
to The State Bar of
California

CTA LEGAL SERVICES DIVISION
[downloaded Feb. 16, 2013]

... The Legal Services Division is
directed by Associate Executive
Director and Acting Chief
Counsel Priscilla Winslow
[since 2012]

The Department also provides for the
defense of members in layoff
proceedings, dismissals and
disciplinary matters, and credential
review proceedings. Requests for legal
services are made through the local
CTA-NEA chapter and primary contact
staff.

Phone: 650/552-5425
Fax: 650/552-5019
E-mail: leghq@cta.org

PERB's strange
relationship with CTA

JANUARY 27, 2013
Priscilla Winslow, CTA acting chief counsel and assistant
executive director, protected child molesting teacher to a far
greater degree than required by contract

CTA went beyond the call of duty to defend a child molesting teacher in the Moraga
School District. CTA members have a contract that only requires CTA to pay about
$20,000 in legal fees when a district wants to fire a teacher. But in this case, one of the
head lawyers for the union, Priscilla Winslow, kept on working for the teacher long after
she'd done $20,000 worth of work. Perhaps the head office worked on the case so there
wouldn't be any large, embarrassing legal bills to show how hard CTA works to protect
child molesters.

Priscilla Winslow is acting chief counsel of CTA for the second time. Winslow held that
position after Beverly Tucker retired, and again recently when Emma Leheny
unexpectedly left that position recently after less than three years on the job. Perhaps
Winslow contributed to her decision to leave?

CTA is shockingly predictable in its protection of child molesters. See the Albert Truitt
case and Fred Kamper case. In the Fred Kamper case, the teachers union even helped
get Kamper elected to the school board, but parent demonstrations caused him to
resign.

Also, see my recent story, "Were CVESD and Chula Vista Educators negligent in Kinloch
child molestation case?" I suspect we'll be hearing a lot more about the John Raymond
Kinloch case in the coming years.

Moraga teacher kept job for two years after allegations of inappropriate
touching of third-graders
By Matthias Gafni
Contra Costa Times
01/26/2013

The Moraga School District learned firsthand how difficult firing a tenured teacher can
be.

It took 17 months to fire former third-grade teacher Charles Bateman even though an
administrative panel ruled he should be terminated for "immoral conduct" and "evident
unfitness for service" after it found he touched six girls under their clothing in his
classroom in 1993. It took six years before he lost his teaching credential.

Two decades later, the statutory due process laws in California remain largely
unchanged.

Bateman was a teacher for 23 years, his final seven at Rheem Elementary School in
Moraga. The once popular teacher, now 69 and living in Brentwood, according to public
records, taught third grade in the 1992-93 school year.

On Feb. 23, 1993, two parents of girls in his class came forward to Principal Paul
Ricciardi after reading of the abuse in a victim's diary. In the end, six girls came forward
with most claiming Bateman reached under their shirts to rub their back, stomach and
chest areas, and sometimes under the girl's pants waistbands, according to court
documents.

Ricciardi appropriately performed his legal "mandated reporting" duties that day and
contacted Child Protective Services and Moraga police and Bateman was immediately
placed on administrative leave.

The school board voted the next month to fire him, but Bateman appealed. In September
1993, all six girls testified at a hearing at Joaquin Moraga Intermediate School before a
three-person Commission on Professional Competence panel. Bateman was paid his full
salary during the investigation and the California Teachers Association paid his legal
bills.

Bateman's defense during the administrative hearings was that he was an affectionate
hugger and that any inappropriate touching was unintentional.

Testimony during the hearing also brought out more troubling realizations about retired
school administrator Bill Walters, who served as principal of Joaquin Moraga middle
school when Bateman taught there. Walters was also entangled in the district's 1990s
child sex abuse scandal when he failed to perform his legal mandated reporting duties
after learning of another teacher accused of abusing students. This failing, critics say,
helped lead to further abuse.

In a 1986 teacher evaluation by Walters, he writes about Bateman: "It is imperative that
Chuck use extreme caution with his physical interactions with students so as not to be
misinterpreted by the community and the district."

The review referenced a letter sent to Walters from a parent that stated Bateman
"engaged in more physical interaction with the girls in his classes than he did with the
boys," according to documents released after a public records act request by this
newspaper.

Rheem Principal Ricciardi also "cautioned" Bateman on occasions before 1993 "that he
should be careful to avoid physical interaction with students, which could be interpreted
as being inappropriate," according to commission records.

The administrative appeal ended with the commission voting unanimously to terminate
Bateman; however, he petitioned Contra Costa Superior Court to overturn the decision.
Bateman's attorney was Priscilla Winslow, who now is acting chief counsel for the
California Teachers Association, running the union's legal services division. She did not
return a call for comment, nor did Bateman.

Bateman lost his appeal, but he continued to fight the state to keep his credential. It's
unclear if he ever taught at another district during his fight while his credential was still
valid.

Bateman was never charged with a crime.

Contact Matthias Gafni at 925-952-5026. Follow him at Twitter.com/mgafni.

Journey to fire teacher

Feb. 23, 1993: Moraga principal calls police after six girls in Charles Bateman's
third-grade class claim the popular teacher touched them under their clothes. He is
immediately placed on administrative leave.
March 23, 1993: The school board votes to fire Bateman.
April 16, 1993: Bateman appeals the firing.
September 1993: The girls testify at a hearing at Joaquin Moraga Intermediate School
before a three-person Commission on Professional Competence panel.
Oct. 26, 1993: The commission votes unanimously to terminate Bateman.
Jan. 12, 1994: Bateman petitions Contra Costa Superior Court to have the decision
overturned.
July 29, 1994: Contra Costa Superior Court Judge James Marchiano denies Bateman's
request to overturn his firing. He is officially terminated.
Feb. 16, 1995: The parents of the girls are alerted that the state is moving to revoke
Bateman's credential.
April 5, 1996: Bateman fights for his credential; parents of children asked if girls could
again testify.
March 25, 1999: Bateman's credential is revoked.

San Diego Education Report

SDER

San Diego
Education Report

SDER

San Diego Education Report

SDER

San Diego
Education Report

SDER

Public Employment Relations
Board)
*See PERB Decision
800.00000;
UNION UNFAIR PRACTICES

"California Teachers
Association, a state wide
organization, is not the
exclusive representative and
does not owe employees a duty
of fair representation." *

CTA relies heavily on the
protection of this decision. The
San Diego Superior Court
disagreed with this decision in
the Maura Larkins' case, but the
issue has not been raised at the
appellate level.

A little-known PERB (Public
Employment Relations Board)
decision allows CTA to run
roughshod over ethical teachers
who try to blow the whistle on
CTA wrongdoing.

Unlike other California unions,
CTA has no legal obligation to
give fair representation. How
did this happen?

How Did CTA Get Special
Permission to Violate
California Labor Law?

Since CTA controls local
affiliates, this decision removes
almost all K-12 teachers in
California from equal
representation protections. Are
the best teachers in charge?
Not by a long shot.

CTA tells local affiliates what
to do, and supplies the
lawyers. CTA is clearly in
charge, but PERB pretends it
isn't.

CTA is not required by PERB to
obey the EERA, or Elementary
Education Relations Act. What
is going on at PERB ?

Theoretically, the local
affiliates have to obey the law,
but PERB has never enforced
the law that requires them to
give equal and fair
representation. CTA members
simply do not enjoy the
protections afforded to other
union members.

Priscilla Winslow blog posts

Job description for
California Teachers
Association post
(downloaded Feb. 18, 2013)

Associate Executive
Director/Chief Counsel
Reference #M-62
Position
Associate Executive
Director/Chief Counsel –
Legal Services

Location
1705 Murchison Drive,
Burlingame, CA 94010

Unit Description and/or
Conditions Unique to
Assignment:

The Chief Counsel serves as
a member of CTA’s executive
management team and
reports directly to the
Executive Director with a
dotted line to CTA’s Board of
Directors. The Chief Counsel
is responsible for managing
CTA’s legal services
department, CTA’s Group
Legal Services program, and
the organization’s legal
matters. As a member of CTA’
s executive management
team, the Chief Counsel
participates in developing and
implementing CTA’s strategies
affecting members and
employees. As the chief
advisor to the CTA Board of
Directors and Executive
Director, the Chief Counsel
provides legal advice on
programs and activities
including business, legislation,
human rights, governance,
and employment related
issues.

Duties and Responsibilities

Advises the CTA Executive
Director and the Board of
Directors
Conducts and/or oversees the
conduct of all litigation on
behalf of CTA and its members
Manages staff members
assigned to the legal
department
Develops preventative legal
strategies, policies, and
compliance programs to
minimize litigation
Serves as a member of the
executive management team
to support and advance CTA’
s mission
Acts as the legal
representative of CTA to
outside agencies in legal
matters
Assigns counsel to represent
members and chapters
Coordinates outside counsel
assigned to CTA labor
relations
Manages the Group Legal
Services Program
Maintains records of all legal
actions and administrative
matters involving legal counsel
Assumes responsibility for
obtaining funding from NEA
for legal services and
coordinating efforts with NEA
on jointly funded litigation
Provides legal advice to the
Executive Director,
management staff and CTA
officers and directors
Develops and implements
training programs for CTA
employees and members
concerning legal issues
Represents CTA in working
with other agencies and
community groups to promote
the mission, goals and core
values of CTA
Manages the legal
department budget
Other duties as assigned by
the Executive Director
Qualifications
J.D. Required
Membership in the State Bar
of California or obtain
membership within first 12
months of employment
Ten or more years of legal
experience practicing labor,
employment and/or education
law, with five or more years of
management experience
preferred
Comprehensive knowledge of
the legal requirements
applicable to employee
organizations
Ability to analyze and interpret
complex legal issues and
documents
Ability to write quickly and
persuasively
Ability to respond effectively
to sensitive inquires and
complaints
Ability to make effective and
persuasive speeches and
presentations on controversial
or complex topics to members,
employee groups, managers,
outside organizations, and the
Board of Directors
Ability to foster and maintain
positive relationships, work
collaboratively with
constituents, and lead,
influence and motivate others
Ability to develop and
implement strategic and
innovative solutions to the
resolution of complex or
sensitive legal issues
Ability to work as a team
member to provide strategic
direction and guidance
regarding legal objectives,
programs and processes
Must have excellent verbal
and written communication
skills, interpersonal skills and
drafting skills