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CVESD relied on welfare cheat as
witness.  K.E. collected Section 8
housing allowance of $600 a month by
saying that her granddaughter was
living with her.  
Where does the paper trail
lead?
Chula Vista Elementary School
District demonstrated its awareness
of the illegality of its actions by
preparing NO documentation
regarding its actions on
February 12,
2001,
April 4, 2001, and April 20, 2001.

MAURA LARKINS
1935 Autocross Court
El Cajon, CA 92019
619 444 0065

Defendant in pro per




        SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                        COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

STUTZ ARTIANO SHINOFF             ) Case No. 37-2007-00076218-CU-DF-CTL
& HOLTZ, APC,                          ) Judge:                 Hon. Judith F. Hayes
        Plaintiff,                          ) Dept:                68
                                           ) Date                 August 7, 2009   10:30 a.m.
                                          )
                                          ) DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS
        vs.                                   ) TO TENTATIVE RULING
                                              ) RE PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED
                                          ) MOTION TO ENFORCE PERMANENT
MAURA LARKINS,                        ) INJUNCTION
        Defendant.                          )
                                                    ) TRIAL DATE: NOT SET
                                          ) CASE FILED: OCTOBER 5, 2007
______________________________)

Comes now Defendant and offers the following objections to tentative ruling regarding Plaintiff’
s Amended Motion to Enforce Permanent Injunction.
I.  Overview
Plaintiff in its Reply asks the court to determine if Plaintiff’s actions that have been reported by
Defendant on her website were unethical or illegal—and then to silence Defendant if and only
if Stutz has been found by the court to have committed an illegal or unethical act.   Silencing
Defendant regarding conduct by Plaintiff which the court deems to be illegal or unethical
seems to be exactly what the court has done in its Tentative Ruling.  Or has the court found
that specific words like “destroying lives” and “threat of jail” are forbidden by injunction that this
Ruling seeks to enforce?  Or that Defendant’s specific words are not an accurate description
of Plaintiff’s actions?  Or that the actions never took place? The injunction at issue is
permanent and therefore it is of great importance that this first, precedent-setting
interpretation of the injunction be not only correct, but also clear.  Defendant asks the court to
clarify this decision so that Defendant can object more effectively to it and the Court of Appeal
can judge more effectively whether this court has ignored the meaning of the injunction,
abused its discretion, and/or violated the First Amendment.  
II.  Defendant asks the court for clarification of its tentative decision.
A. Was the truth of Defendant’s statements an issue in this motion ruling?  
If truth is an issue, the court needs to conduct a mini-trial or mini-summary judgment on each
item of contention, which would require that Plaintiff dispute the truth of each item and produce
documents (such as the written speech read by Leslie Devaney at the Tri-City Healthcare
board meeting on January 5, 2009) and depose witnesses.  Plaintiff has not disputed the truth
of the statements, but has suggested that Defendant has not fully proved their truth.  
B. What has the court found to fall within the purview of the injunction—specific WORDS by
Defendant, or specific ACTIONS by Plaintiff?
                Is the court forbidding specific phrases, such as “destroying lives” or “threat of jail”,
or is the court forbidding a discussion of specific actions by Plaintiff?  In other words, does the
court find that:
(1) Defendant’s specific words are forbidden by the injunction; or
(2) Defendant’s specific words are at variance with Plaintiff’s behavior; or
(3) Plaintiff’s behavior  is illegal or unethical?
(1) Defendant objects if the court is allowing Plaintiff to add specific words willy-nilly to the
injunction.  Given the wholesale nature of this motion ruling, it appears that the court is
allowing Plaintiff to add any and all words it wishes to the injunction.  If the court’s decision
reflects the courts belief that a specific phrase or sentence published by Defendant, such as
“destroying lives” or “threat of jail”, is forbidden by the injunction, Defendant asks the court to
clarify this for each of the nine items addressed in the Motion and Opposition.
(2) Does the court find that Defendant’s words are not an accurate description of Plaintiff’s
behavior? For example, does the court find that calling up the district attorney to report
someone whom Plaintiff has just been hired to sue in civil court cannot fairly be described as
“using the threat of jail in a civil suit”?
(3) Is the court forbidding a discussion of specific actions by Plaintiff, such as throwing or
keeping opponents in jail, or calling up the District Attorney to report someone whom Plaintiff
has just been hired to sue in civil court, on the basis that those actions are illegal or unethical
and therefore discussion of them is forbidden by the injunction?
If Plaintiff’s behavior has been found to be illegal or unethical by the court, then Defendant
asks the court to make this crystal clear.  This is a matter of concern for the legal system and
society as a whole.  Do the court and Plaintiff also agree that the court is required to report the
behavior to the proper authorities once it has been determined to be unethical or illegal?    
Defendant asks the court to clarify the basis of its decisions on each of the nine issues
addressed by Plaintiff and Defendant (except for issue number eight, which Defendant has
already fixed) so that Defendant will be able to object more effectively to the Tentative Ruling
regarding the instant motion.  
III. This case has devolved into a mind-boggling morass.  
The bizarreness of Plaintiff’s argument is shown by the fact that Plaintiff has worked hard in its
Reply to prove that its own actions are unethical, immoral or illegal. The incongruity of this
court’s August 7, 2009 decision is demonstrated by the fact that Plaintiff does not claim to be
falsely accused, nor does it defend itself by saying it took the described actions in good faith.  
Far from it.  Plaintiff vociferously insists that the acts were unethical or illegal, or both, and that
this is why Defendant must remove statements about those actions from her website.
IV. The court’s decision is an abuse of judicial discretion
The court’s tentative ruling is an abuse of judicial discretion.  For example, the court’s ruling
that Defendant may not report that Daniel Shinoff’s tactics have “destroyed lives” is an
example of arbitrary and unreasonable decision-making.  There is no reasonable basis on
which the court could find this statement to be a violation of the injunction.  Many court cases
are extremely serious, and their outcomes leave some parties financially, emotionally or
professionally destroyed.  Lives are destroyed in courtrooms on a regular basis, and it is
perfectly legal to use the court to do this.  It is clearly ethical, too, as far as the Bar Association
is concerned.  It is preposterous for the court to rule that Defendant accuses Daniel Shinoff of
illegal conduct when she makes the statement that Daniel Shinoff destroys lives with his legal
tactics.  It’s a simple fact that Daniel Shinoff’s tactics have cost some individuals their homes,
jobs, savings and sanity, and that Mr. Shinoff acted within the legal and ethical bounds of the
justice system.  Yet it seems clear that the court has found the described behavior to be
unethical or illegal.  
V. The injunction
Plaintiff’s Reply states, “[Defendant]…should not now be allowed to second-guess her
decision by challenging the scope of the injunction as violative of the First Amendment,
effectively denying SASH the benefit of its bargain (page 2, lines 21-22).   Clearly, SASH
wishes to deny the limits of its bargain.  The injunction clearly specifies and forbids a short list
of statements that would be defamatory if they were false.  The word “intimidation” was also
added to the list of words.  The injunction prevents Defendant from saying specific words
about the Stutz actions she reports.   Defendant agreed not to make these statements even if
they are true. Defendant did not agree to censor, and the injunction does not require
Defendant to censor, any speech outside this list of specific statements.  On April 6, 2009
Defendant discussed with Plaintiff’s lawyers James F. Holtz and Jeffrey Wade, Jr. this precise
issue: that Defendant would be free to report on Plaintiff’s actions, but would not be free to
describe them as illegal, unethical, incompetent or intimidating.  The idea that Defendant
voluntarily gave up her First Amendment Rights beyond these limited parameters is
preposterous.
The new interpretation of the injunction approved in the court’s Tentative Ruling is abusive of
discretion.  Defendant assumes that the court concurs with the new interpretation of the
injunction as explained in Plaintiff’s Reply, but asks the court to clarify this and other issues
outlined in these objections.  
The meaning of the injunction was discussed in careful detail on April 6, 2009 and is limited to
certain words that would be defamatory if false—plus the accusation of intimidation.  
VI. Did Plaintiff perpetrate a fraud on April 6, 2009?
If at the time the agreement on the injunction was signed, April 6, 2009, Plaintiff intended to
interpret the agreement as it has done in its Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to the instant
motion, then Plaintiff obtained Defendant’s agreement through deceit and fraud.  This issue
was thoroughly discussed by Plaintiff and Defendant.  We conferred for hours, We discussed
in detail exactly what the agreement meant.  It referred to specific words—illegal, unethical,
incompetent and intimidating.  It referred to words that would be defamatory per se if they were
false, plus the word “intimidation”.  The Reply seems to have been written by someone who
had not been involved in this case previously; it claims an entirely new interpretation of the
injunction.   Interestingly, the instant motion marks Stutz attorney Leslie Devaney’s debut as an
issue in this case.  Defendant suspects that Ms. Devaney wasn’t mentioned in previous
pleadings by Plaintiff in order to make it possible for the court to find that the Stutz lawyers at
issue were private figures.  This is bait and switch, a classic fraudulent practice.
Defendant’s behavior has been consistent with the clear meaning of the injunction.  
Defendant has continued to report on Stutz law firm, but have avoided any of the defamatory-
when-false statements clearly specified in the injunction.
 The Reply states, “[The injunction]… applies to all statements that even accuse SASH or its
attorneys of certain conduct” (page 2, lines 19-20).  This is incorrect and absurd.  The
injunction refers to words Defendant may not use to describe Plaintiff’s conduct, not her
freedom to discuss Plaintiff’s conduct itself.  Plaintiff is free to report Stutz law firm’s conduct as
long as she doesn’t characterize it as illegal, unethical, incompetent, or intimidating.
Plaintiff’s Reply claims that the injunction sets up a system in which the court will determine
whether any reported action by plaintiff is unethical or illegal or incompetent or an act of
intimidation.  It does not.  In fact, the injunction prevents defendant from using specific words
(unethical, incompetent, intimidating, illegal, etc.) to describe plaintiff.  The injunction does not
deny freedom of speech to defendant.
This wording of the injunction was not created by the court, but by the parties.  Its intent was
clear.  It should not be reinterpreted now.  The injunction is about WORDS ONLY, NOT
ACTIONS.  The court does not have the authority to restrict legal free speech, and Defendant
did not agree to do so.   
VII.  Clarification needed: Does the court find Leslie Devaney to be a private or a public figure?
A new factor has been injected into this case: the worrisome issue of attorney Leslie
Devaney.  The court has failed to address in its tentative ruling whether or not it considers
Leslie Devaney to be a public figure.   Leslie Devaney was never mentioned in pleadings
before the injunction was agreed upon. Did the judge intend on April 6, 2009 that the
injunction would cover Stutz lawyers even if they run for very high profile public offices?   Has a
classic bait-and-switch occurred in this case?
VIII. Abuse of discretion by the court regarding Stutz attorney Leslie Devaney
Judge Hayes volunteered that she didn’t know Dan Shinoff; her honor had not been
challenged or questioned on the issue.  Clearly, her honor meant this to refer to any social
relationship since she has presided in Dan Shinoff cases.  Now Defendant has challenged
Judge Hayes regarding her relationship with Leslie Devaney.  This would be a good time for
Judge Hayes to reveal whether or not she knows Leslie Devaney.  Leslie Devaney and Plaintiff
are closely linked. The entrance of Leslie Devaney into the case opens up the question as to
whether the judge should have recused herself at the beginning of the case.  This case was
transferred to Judge Hayes for unknown reasons when it came back from federal court.  
Interestingly, this is not the only Daniel Shinoff case that has been transferred from Judge
Quinn to Judge Hayes.  Now that the Plaintiff’s relationship to the judge is more fully revealed,
it would be appropriate to have a different judge take over the case.  There has been abuse of
discretion in this case since the court allowed Daniel Shinoff to refuse to be deposed and to
refuse to produce documents.
Did Leslie Devaney act inappropriately when she reported four Tri-City Healthcare board
members to the District Attorney within weeks, if not days, of having been hired to oppose
them in civil court?  Plaintiff says that if Devaney’s action, the fact of which was reported in two
newspaper articles that Defendant included in her Opposition to this motion, was illegal or
unethical or intimidating, then the injunction requires the court to order Defendant to take the
report off her site.   It appears that the court has found Devaney’s action to be unethical,
illegal and/or intimidating.  The court most certainly needs to follow up on its decision with a
communication to the Bar Association and/or District Attorney.
VI. Abuse of Discretion: Is the court improperly protecting Plaintiff?
If court determines that Plaintiff’s actions were illegal or unethical, the court has the obligation
to report them to the Bar Association or the District Attorney.  If the court does not do this, it is
an indication of improper bias on the part of the court.  The abuse of discretion began when
the court allowed Daniel Shinoff and Plaintiff to refuse to be deposed or to produce documents.
VII. Violation of the First Amendment
The manner in which Judge Hayes has interpreted the injunction is counter to its original
intent, to state and federal constitutions protecting freedom of speech, and constitutes an
abuse of judicial discretion.  Reality and reason are allowed no role by the court in the
interpretation of the injunction.  Instead, the enforcement of the judgment is arbitrary and
biased.  With this Reply and Tentative Ruling, Plaintiff and the court are creating an ugly and
unjustifiable vehicle for abuse of Defendant’s basic rights.  It is false and preposterous to claim
that Defendant voluntarily gave up her First Amendment Rights (beyond the short list of words
she agreed not to use) when she signed the injunction.  This court has no right to take those
rights away from Defendant.  
DATED:  August 7, 2009                                                
                                Maura Larkins, Defendant in pro per