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SANCHEZ v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY OFFICE OF EDUCATION
OCTAVIO SANCHEZ et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY OFFICE OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.
No. D054560.
Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division One.
Filed March 23, 2010.
The Viviano Law Firm and Charles A. Viviano for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz, Daniel R. Shinoff and Paul V. Carelli, IV, for Defendants and
Respondents.
McDONALD, J.
Education Code section 35330 (§ 35330) provides a school district immunity from liability for school
district student injuries occurring during a field trip conducted by the school district. In this action, we
decide whether section 35330 provides a school district immunity from liability for student injuries
occurring during a field trip on property owned and operated by a school district, which was not the
school district in which the student attended school. The trial court found the school district was
entitled to the immunity afforded by section 35330, and this appeal followed.
I
FACTUAL AND PRODECURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Facts
San Diego County Office of Education (SDCOE) is a school district within the meaning of that term in
section 35330. It owns and operates a facility known as Camp Fox, an outdoor school facility located at
the base of Palomar Mountain. All of the employees of Camp Fox are employed by SDCOE. Camp Fox
provides science-related programs to student attendees.
In February 2006, Virginia Sanchez was a sixth grade student attending McCabe Elementary School, a
school within the McCabe Union School District. During the week of February 13, 2006, Virginia (along
with classmates and teachers from McCabe Elementary) attended Camp Fox for a five-day field trip,
commonly known as "sixth grade camp." Attendance at sixth grade camp is voluntary.
On February 16, 2006, while at Camp Fox, Virginia suffered an asthma coronary attack. Camp
counselors gave Virginia her asthma inhaler, and performed CPR until paramedics arrived. However,
by the time paramedics were able to airlift Virginia to Children's Hospital, she had died from natural
causes.
B. The Lawsuit and Judgment
As a result of Virginia's death, her parents (Parents) filed this action for damages against SDCOE
alleging it (1) was negligent in not providing adequate medical staffing at Camp Fox, and (2)
negligently misrepresented the level of medical staffing that would be provided at Camp Fox.
SDCOE moved for summary judgment, asserting the facts were undisputed and the only disputed
issue was whether the immunity provided by section 35330 applied to SDCOE on the facts of this
case. Parents did not identify any disputed facts,[ 1 ] but instead asserted that SDCOE was not
protected by the immunity conferred by section 35330. The trial court entered judgment in favor of
SDCOE. This appeal followed.
II
ANALYSIS
The sole issue is the proper interpretation of section 35330.[ 2 ] The parties agree that our review is
de novo. (See, e.g., People ex. rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415.)
Section 35330 provides: "(a) The governing board of a school district or the county superintendent of
schools of a county may: [¶] (1) Conduct field trips or excursions in connection with courses of
instruction or school-related social, educational, cultural, athletic, or school band activities to and from
places in the state . . . ." To further that end, that district may provide equipment and supplies for the
field trip or excursion and engage instructors and other personnel to contribute their services (§
35330, subd. (a)(2)); may use district equipment or contract for equipment to provide transportation
(subd. (a)(3)); and may provide supervision of pupils involved in field trips or excursions by certificated
employees of the district (subd. (a)(4)). Students may not be excluded from field trips because of lack
of funds (subd. (b)), and the attendance or participation of a student in a field trip or excursion shall be
considered attendance for state education funding purposes (subd. (c)).
The so called "field trip immunity" provided by section 35330, subdivision (d), "is a relatively new
creature of statute." (Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 177, 184 (Casterson).)
Subdivision (d) provides that "[a]ll persons making the field trip or excursion shall be deemed to have
waived all claims against the district, a charter school, or the State of California for injury, accident,
illness, or death occurring during or by reason of the field trip or excursion." The courts have
construed the "deemed to have waived" language contained in section 35330, subdivision (d), as
creating a "broad immunity." (Wolfe v. Dublin Unified School Dist. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 126, 130;
accord, Casterson, at p. 180.) The immunity, part of the scheme designed to encourage the use of
field trips as an important part of enhancing the educational process (see, e.g., Assem. Com. on
Education, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 766 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.) as amended April 9, 2007, p. 6),[ 3
] encourages field trips by protecting school districts from exposure to personal injury claims arising
from field trips and thereby lessening the costs for the trips. (See Casterson, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 188-190 [one aspect of the Legislature's intent in enacting the predecessor to section 35330
was to authorize school field trips on the condition that public expenses for the trips be minimized].)
The parties agree with this synopsis of the overarching purposes of section 35330 and the field trip
immunity provision. However, they disagree over the legislative intent regarding what entities are
entitled to claim the protection of subdivision (d). Parents assert the immunity is limited to the district in
which the injured child was enrolled (denominated by Parents as the home district), and contend it has
no application to another school district (denominated by Parents as the foreign district) whose
negligence may have contributed to the injury, because the remaining provisions of section 35330
describe the rights and duties of the school district providing the field trip. SDCOE argues, in contrast,
that nothing in section 35330 suggests the grant of immunity is limited to the student's home district
when multiple school districts jointly provide the field trip.
The immunity granted by section 35330, subdivision (d), applies to "the district." The ordinary import of
the language employed in subdivision (d) is to refer to the school district described in subdivision (a),
specifically, "a school district" that "[c]onduct[ed] [the] field trip[] or excursion[] in connection with
courses of instruction or school-related social, educational, cultural, athletic, or school band activities."
(Id. at subd. (a)(1).) Because we construe a statute by "assigning [the] usual and ordinary meanings
[to the statutory language] and construing [the language] in context" (Wells v. One2One Learning
Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1190), we conclude that SDCOE qualifies for the immunity
granted under subdivision (d) if SDCOE was "a [school] district" that conducted the field trip at Camp
Fox.
It is undisputed that SDCOE was and is "a [school] district" within the meaning of section 35330, thus
satisfying the first criterion for immunity. We are also convinced there is no triable issue of fact that
SDCOE took part in "conduct[ing]" the field trip to Camp Fox. We construe the words of a statute using
their ordinary meaning (see, e.g., Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735), and the
standard dictionary definition of the verb "conduct," which is a term of common usage and so must be
understood in its everyday meaning (see People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215), includes
directing or taking part in the operation or management of the field trip. (See, e.g., Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2006) p. 259 [defining verb "conduct" to include "to direct or take part in the
operation or management of" the subject]; Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) [as of March 19, 2010],
at def. 6 [defining verb "conduct" as including "To direct, manage, carry on (a transaction, process,
business, institution, legal case, etc.). [¶] The notion of direction or leadership is often obscured or
lost; e.g. an investigation is conducted by all those who take part in it."].) It is undisputed that SDCOE
participated by providing the physical facility for the field trip. Moreover, although the record does not
disclose precisely how the labor involved in conducting the Camp Fox field trip was divided between
SDCOE employees and employees of the McCabe Union School District, Parents did not dispute that
(1) SDCOE operated the facility at which the field trip was held, (2) McCabe Union School District "use
[d] the Outdoor Education Program . . . provided by [SDCOE]," and (3) "[a]ll employees at Camp Fox
are [SDCOE] employees." On this record, we are convinced there is no triable issue of fact that
SDCOE played a sufficiently significant role in "conduct[ing]" the field trip to Camp Fox to satisfy the
second qualifying criterion for immunity under section 35330, subdivision (d).
Parents' principal arguments for a contrary interpretation are their textual construction of section
35330, and their assertion that the policies underlying section 35330 will not be advanced by our
interpretation and will lead to absurd results. Parents' textual argument is that each of the subdivisions
of section 35330 addresses issues relevant only to the home district, and therefore its immunity
provisions likewise should be restricted to the home district. However, the statute itself neither employs
the term "home district" nor distinguishes between a home district and a foreign district. The fact that
some of the provisions of section 35330 may be applicable solely to the student's home district (see, e.
g., § 35330, subd. (c)(1) [student's participation in field trip counts as attendance in school for state
funding purposes]) does not necessarily mean that all provisions of section 35330 are applicable
solely to the student's home district.[ 4 ]
Parents, relying on Casterson, also argue the policies promoted by section 35330 demonstrate that
the legislative intent behind the immunity provisions was to eliminate the financial burdens of field trips
on the student's home district, and extending immunity to foreign districts does not further that policy.[
5 ] In Casterson, the plaintiff asserted section 35330's immunity should not be construed to protect a
district's employee for injuries caused by the employee's negligence during the field trip because
subdivision (d) did not expressly cover employees, while other provisions of the Education Code
limiting liability for personal injuries did expressly cover employees. The employee argued section
35330 should be construed to cover employees to preserve the legislative purposes of protecting
school districts from liability for injuries on field trips. (Casterson, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 186-
187.) The Casterson court, after noting the purpose of the immunity provision was to prevent school
districts from exposure to liability for injuries on field trips, concluded the plaintiff's construction would
frustrate the legislative purposes because the school district would become indirectly liable for the
injuries under the indemnification obligations imposed by Government Code section 825. (Casterson,
at pp. 186-187.) Casterson therefore held that "[i]ncluding school district employees is necessary to
avoid the absurd consequence of the de facto elimination of the field trip immunity for school districts,
which the Legislature intended to provide when it enacted . . . section 35330." (Id. at p. 189.)
Our interpretation of section 35330—that it is not limited to the student's home district but includes any
school district that is a significant participant in conducting the field trip—accords with the policy
underlying section 35330. If Parents' contention were accepted, and a school district that cooperates
with the student's home district to conduct the field trip is not entitled to statutory immunity, the
cooperating school district would be required to obtain contractual indemnity from the home district as
a condition to allowing the home district to use the cooperating district's facilities and personnel for the
home district's field trip. This would impose a Hobson's choice for the home district: either abandon the
opportunity to provide its students with the unique learning opportunities provided by field trips utilizing
the cooperating district's facilities, or effectively forfeit the immunity conferred on the home district by
section 35330. We conclude that result would frustrate the proposes and policies section 35330
sought to embody, and therefore we are not persuaded by Parents' interpretation of section 35330.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. SDCOE is entitled to its costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
AARON, J.
This copy provided by Leagle, Inc.
OCTAVIO SANCHEZ et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY OFFICE OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.
No. D054560.
Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division One.
Filed March 23, 2010.
The Viviano Law Firm and Charles A. Viviano for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz, Daniel R. Shinoff and Paul V. Carelli, IV, for Defendants and
Respondents.
McDONALD, J.
Education Code section 35330 (§ 35330) provides a school district immunity from liability for school
district student injuries occurring during a field trip conducted by the school district. In this action, we
decide whether section 35330 provides a school district immunity from liability for student injuries
occurring during a field trip on property owned and operated by a school district, which was not the
school district in which the student attended school. The trial court found the school district was
entitled to the immunity afforded by section 35330, and this appeal followed.
I
FACTUAL AND PRODECURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Facts
San Diego County Office of Education (SDCOE) is a school district within the meaning of that term in
section 35330. It owns and operates a facility known as Camp Fox, an outdoor school facility located at
the base of Palomar Mountain. All of the employees of Camp Fox are employed by SDCOE. Camp Fox
provides science-related programs to student attendees.
In February 2006, Virginia Sanchez was a sixth grade student attending McCabe Elementary School, a
school within the McCabe Union School District. During the week of February 13, 2006, Virginia (along
with classmates and teachers from McCabe Elementary) attended Camp Fox for a five-day field trip,
commonly known as "sixth grade camp." Attendance at sixth grade camp is voluntary.
On February 16, 2006, while at Camp Fox, Virginia suffered an asthma coronary attack. Camp
counselors gave Virginia her asthma inhaler, and performed CPR until paramedics arrived. However,
by the time paramedics were able to airlift Virginia to Children's Hospital, she had died from natural
causes.
B. The Lawsuit and Judgment
As a result of Virginia's death, her parents (Parents) filed this action for damages against SDCOE
alleging it (1) was negligent in not providing adequate medical staffing at Camp Fox, and (2)
negligently misrepresented the level of medical staffing that would be provided at Camp Fox.
SDCOE moved for summary judgment, asserting the facts were undisputed and the only disputed
issue was whether the immunity provided by section 35330 applied to SDCOE on the facts of this
case. Parents did not identify any disputed facts,[ 1 ] but instead asserted that SDCOE was not
protected by the immunity conferred by section 35330. The trial court entered judgment in favor of
SDCOE. This appeal followed.
II
ANALYSIS
The sole issue is the proper interpretation of section 35330.[ 2 ] The parties agree that our review is
de novo. (See, e.g., People ex. rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415.)
Section 35330 provides: "(a) The governing board of a school district or the county superintendent of
schools of a county may: [¶] (1) Conduct field trips or excursions in connection with courses of
instruction or school-related social, educational, cultural, athletic, or school band activities to and from
places in the state . . . ." To further that end, that district may provide equipment and supplies for the
field trip or excursion and engage instructors and other personnel to contribute their services (§
35330, subd. (a)(2)); may use district equipment or contract for equipment to provide transportation
(subd. (a)(3)); and may provide supervision of pupils involved in field trips or excursions by certificated
employees of the district (subd. (a)(4)). Students may not be excluded from field trips because of lack
of funds (subd. (b)), and the attendance or participation of a student in a field trip or excursion shall be
considered attendance for state education funding purposes (subd. (c)).
The so called "field trip immunity" provided by section 35330, subdivision (d), "is a relatively new
creature of statute." (Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 177, 184 (Casterson).)
Subdivision (d) provides that "[a]ll persons making the field trip or excursion shall be deemed to have
waived all claims against the district, a charter school, or the State of California for injury, accident,
illness, or death occurring during or by reason of the field trip or excursion." The courts have
construed the "deemed to have waived" language contained in section 35330, subdivision (d), as
creating a "broad immunity." (Wolfe v. Dublin Unified School Dist. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 126, 130;
accord, Casterson, at p. 180.) The immunity, part of the scheme designed to encourage the use of
field trips as an important part of enhancing the educational process (see, e.g., Assem. Com. on
Education, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 766 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.) as amended April 9, 2007, p. 6),[ 3
] encourages field trips by protecting school districts from exposure to personal injury claims arising
from field trips and thereby lessening the costs for the trips. (See Casterson, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 188-190 [one aspect of the Legislature's intent in enacting the predecessor to section 35330
was to authorize school field trips on the condition that public expenses for the trips be minimized].)
The parties agree with this synopsis of the overarching purposes of section 35330 and the field trip
immunity provision. However, they disagree over the legislative intent regarding what entities are
entitled to claim the protection of subdivision (d). Parents assert the immunity is limited to the district in
which the injured child was enrolled (denominated by Parents as the home district), and contend it has
no application to another school district (denominated by Parents as the foreign district) whose
negligence may have contributed to the injury, because the remaining provisions of section 35330
describe the rights and duties of the school district providing the field trip. SDCOE argues, in contrast,
that nothing in section 35330 suggests the grant of immunity is limited to the student's home district
when multiple school districts jointly provide the field trip.
The immunity granted by section 35330, subdivision (d), applies to "the district." The ordinary import of
the language employed in subdivision (d) is to refer to the school district described in subdivision (a),
specifically, "a school district" that "[c]onduct[ed] [the] field trip[] or excursion[] in connection with
courses of instruction or school-related social, educational, cultural, athletic, or school band activities."
(Id. at subd. (a)(1).) Because we construe a statute by "assigning [the] usual and ordinary meanings
[to the statutory language] and construing [the language] in context" (Wells v. One2One Learning
Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1190), we conclude that SDCOE qualifies for the immunity
granted under subdivision (d) if SDCOE was "a [school] district" that conducted the field trip at Camp
Fox.
It is undisputed that SDCOE was and is "a [school] district" within the meaning of section 35330, thus
satisfying the first criterion for immunity. We are also convinced there is no triable issue of fact that
SDCOE took part in "conduct[ing]" the field trip to Camp Fox. We construe the words of a statute using
their ordinary meaning (see, e.g., Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735), and the
standard dictionary definition of the verb "conduct," which is a term of common usage and so must be
understood in its everyday meaning (see People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215), includes
directing or taking part in the operation or management of the field trip. (See, e.g., Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2006) p. 259 [defining verb "conduct" to include "to direct or take part in the
operation or management of" the subject]; Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) [as of March 19, 2010],
at def. 6 [defining verb "conduct" as including "To direct, manage, carry on (a transaction, process,
business, institution, legal case, etc.). [¶] The notion of direction or leadership is often obscured or
lost; e.g. an investigation is conducted by all those who take part in it."].) It is undisputed that SDCOE
participated by providing the physical facility for the field trip. Moreover, although the record does not
disclose precisely how the labor involved in conducting the Camp Fox field trip was divided between
SDCOE employees and employees of the McCabe Union School District, Parents did not dispute that
(1) SDCOE operated the facility at which the field trip was held, (2) McCabe Union School District "use
[d] the Outdoor Education Program . . . provided by [SDCOE]," and (3) "[a]ll employees at Camp Fox
are [SDCOE] employees." On this record, we are convinced there is no triable issue of fact that
SDCOE played a sufficiently significant role in "conduct[ing]" the field trip to Camp Fox to satisfy the
second qualifying criterion for immunity under section 35330, subdivision (d).
Parents' principal arguments for a contrary interpretation are their textual construction of section
35330, and their assertion that the policies underlying section 35330 will not be advanced by our
interpretation and will lead to absurd results. Parents' textual argument is that each of the subdivisions
of section 35330 addresses issues relevant only to the home district, and therefore its immunity
provisions likewise should be restricted to the home district. However, the statute itself neither employs
the term "home district" nor distinguishes between a home district and a foreign district. The fact that
some of the provisions of section 35330 may be applicable solely to the student's home district (see, e.
g., § 35330, subd. (c)(1) [student's participation in field trip counts as attendance in school for state
funding purposes]) does not necessarily mean that all provisions of section 35330 are applicable
solely to the student's home district.[ 4 ]
Parents, relying on Casterson, also argue the policies promoted by section 35330 demonstrate that
the legislative intent behind the immunity provisions was to eliminate the financial burdens of field trips
on the student's home district, and extending immunity to foreign districts does not further that policy.[
5 ] In Casterson, the plaintiff asserted section 35330's immunity should not be construed to protect a
district's employee for injuries caused by the employee's negligence during the field trip because
subdivision (d) did not expressly cover employees, while other provisions of the Education Code
limiting liability for personal injuries did expressly cover employees. The employee argued section
35330 should be construed to cover employees to preserve the legislative purposes of protecting
school districts from liability for injuries on field trips. (Casterson, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 186-
187.) The Casterson court, after noting the purpose of the immunity provision was to prevent school
districts from exposure to liability for injuries on field trips, concluded the plaintiff's construction would
frustrate the legislative purposes because the school district would become indirectly liable for the
injuries under the indemnification obligations imposed by Government Code section 825. (Casterson,
at pp. 186-187.) Casterson therefore held that "[i]ncluding school district employees is necessary to
avoid the absurd consequence of the de facto elimination of the field trip immunity for school districts,
which the Legislature intended to provide when it enacted . . . section 35330." (Id. at p. 189.)
Our interpretation of section 35330—that it is not limited to the student's home district but includes any
school district that is a significant participant in conducting the field trip—accords with the policy
underlying section 35330. If Parents' contention were accepted, and a school district that cooperates
with the student's home district to conduct the field trip is not entitled to statutory immunity, the
cooperating school district would be required to obtain contractual indemnity from the home district as
a condition to allowing the home district to use the cooperating district's facilities and personnel for the
home district's field trip. This would impose a Hobson's choice for the home district: either abandon the
opportunity to provide its students with the unique learning opportunities provided by field trips utilizing
the cooperating district's facilities, or effectively forfeit the immunity conferred on the home district by
section 35330. We conclude that result would frustrate the proposes and policies section 35330
sought to embody, and therefore we are not persuaded by Parents' interpretation of section 35330.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. SDCOE is entitled to its costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
AARON, J.
This copy provided by Leagle, Inc.
This case is interesting, among other reasons, in that it was assigned to Judge Linda B.
Quinn, who turned it over to Judge Judith Hayes. The same thing happened in Stutz
Artiano Shinoff & Holtz' defamation suit against this website. Clearly, this isn't random
selection of judges. It subverts the process. I overheard one of Judge Hayes' bailiffs
saying that Judges Quinn and Hayes "send the overflow to each other." Overflow?
That would mean one judge had more cases than the other, and therefore the cases
would be sent in one direction only. This is something different. What exactly is going
on in Departments 68 and 74 of San Diego Superior Court.
Quinn, who turned it over to Judge Judith Hayes. The same thing happened in Stutz
Artiano Shinoff & Holtz' defamation suit against this website. Clearly, this isn't random
selection of judges. It subverts the process. I overheard one of Judge Hayes' bailiffs
saying that Judges Quinn and Hayes "send the overflow to each other." Overflow?
That would mean one judge had more cases than the other, and therefore the cases
would be sent in one direction only. This is something different. What exactly is going
on in Departments 68 and 74 of San Diego Superior Court.
SANCHEZ v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY
OFFICE OF EDUCATION
OFFICE OF EDUCATION
San Diego
Education Report
Education Report