While the grounds for an
equitable action to set
aside a default judgment
are commonly stated as
being those of extrinsic
fraud or mistake, the terms
are given a very broad
meaning which tends to
encompass all
circumstances that deprive
an adversary of fair notice
of hearing whether or not
those circumstances would
qualify as fraudulent or
mistaken in the strict sense.
Thus a false recital of
service although not
deliberate is treated as
extrinsic fraud or mistake in
the context of an equitable
action to set aside a default
judgment. Bennett v.
Hibernia Bank, (1956) 47
Cal.2d 540, 558, See also
Carroll v. Abbott
Laboratories (1982) 32 Cal.
3d 892, 901-902, and Weitz
v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Cal.
2d 849, 855.
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Extrinsic fraud is demonstrated by showing that a party has been deprived of a
fair opportunity to present a claim or defense in court. (Estate of Sanders (1985)
40 Cal.3d 607, 614; City and County of San Francisco v. Cartagena (1995) 35
Cal.App.4th 1061, 1067.)
In Estate of Sanders, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pages 614-615, our Supreme Court
explained: "The seminal definition of extrinsic fraud is found in United States v.
Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 65-66: `Where the unsuccessful party has
been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practi[c]ed
on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a
compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept
in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or
without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or
where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client's interest to
the other side, these, and similar cases which show that there has never been a
real contest in the trial or hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit
may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment or decree, and
open the case for a new and fair hearing. [Citations.] [¶] In all these cases, and
many others which have been examined, relief has been granted, on the ground
that, by some fraud practi[c]ed directly upon the party seeking relief against the
judgment or decree, that party has been prevented from presenting all of his
case to the court.' [¶] We recently observed that `[extrinsic] fraud is a broad
concept that "tend[s] to encompass almost any set of extrinsic circumstances
which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing."' [Citations.] The clearest
examples of extrinsic fraud cases in which the aggrieved party is kept in
ignorance of the proceeding or is in some other way induced not to appear.
[Citation.] In both situations the party is `fraudulently prevented from presenting
his claim or defense.' [Citations.]" Thus, the essence of an extrinsic fraud claim is
that one party has deliberately prevented the other party from having his or her
day in court either by concealment, failure to give notice of the action, or
convincing the other party to refrain from presenting a claim or defense. (Estate
of Sanders, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 614-615; Sporn v. Home Depot USA,
Inc.(2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1300; Groves v. Peterson (2002) 100
Cal.App.4th 659, 665.)
Extrinsic Fraud