MAURA LARKINS
619 660 6955
Plaintiff in pro per


SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
         COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO


MAURA LARKINS,                                                  ) Case No.            GIC 781970
Plaintiff,                                                                  ) Judge:                Hon. William R. Nevitt, Jr.
                                                                            ) Dept:           64
vs.                                                                          ) Hearing date:  June 13, 2003
                                                                            )
CHULA VISTA ELEMENTARY SCHOOL                 )
DISTRICT, a California public entity,                      ) PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM
CHULA VISTA ELEMENTARY EDUCATION            ) OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
ASSOCIATION, a California labor organization,     ) IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’
RICHARD T. WERLIN,                                            ) MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
GINA BOYD,                                                           ) ORDER
ROBIN COLLS,                                                       )
BRIAN DOIG,                                                          )
and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,                        )
Defendants.                                                           )
                                                                            )  COMPLAINT FILED: 1/24/2002
                                                                            )  TRIAL DATE: NOT SET


Comes now Plaintiff and offers the following memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to Defendants’
Motion for Protective Order.

                 CONTENTS

I.        ANSWERS TO BRIAN DOIG’S 20 INTERROGATORIES ARE URGENTLY NEEDED.
II.        TWELVE OF PLAINTIFF’S CAUSES OF ACTION ARE UNHARMED BY THE COMMISSION’S DECISION.
III.        ONLY SEVEN CAUSES OF ACTION ARE NEGATIVELY AFFECTED BY THE COMMISSION’S DECISION.
IV.        CONTRARY TO THEIR CLAIM, DEFENDANTS HAVE PROCEEDED AGRESSIVELY WITH DISCOVERY SINCE
THEY WERE GRANTED A PROTECTIVE ORDER AGAINST DEPOSITIONS.
V.        PLAINTIFF IS UNABLE TO FINALIZE THE PLEADINGS GIVEN THE EXTREME LACK OF COOPERATION OF
DEFENDANTS IN DISCOVERY.

                 DISCUSSION
I.  ANSWERS TO BRIAN DOIG’S 20 INTERROGATORIES ARE URGENTLY NEEDED

Less than three months remain before the three-year statute of limitations runs out on the civil tort, which has been
alleged in this case, of records of an arrest which did not lead to a conviction having been obtained and published by
some defendants.  In order to permit discovery of the precise identity of the individual(s) who illegally obtained and
published records of Plaintiff’s arrest which did not result in a conviction, defendants must respond to special
interrogatories.  Defendants, in their Motion for a Protective Order, make the odd argument that discovery should not
be allowed in this case until all the parties and facts are known.

It is of utmost importance that Brian Doig respond to the 20 special interrogatories which were served on him on April
11, 2003.  He has refused even to provide his telephone number after the court ordered him to do so.  On March 28,
2003, during a Case Management Conference, the Court suggested that in lieu of deposing Mr. Doig, he be served
with 20 special interrogatories regarding his identity and the facts of the case, in order to find out whether counsel for
CHULA VISTA ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT is correct in alleging that Plaintiff mistakenly sued Brian Doig, when
she would more appropriately have sued his alleged, unnamed brother.

Also, the true answers to the 20 special interrogatories propounded to Mr. Doig will clear up the question of whether
the signature on the Declaration of Brian Doig, filed by Defendants as Exhibit E in their April 17, 2003 Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion to File a Fifth Amended Complaint, is authentic.  

Since the lawyers for Chula Vista Elementary School District are not representing Mr. Doig, and the declaration is not
notarized, Defendants’ counsel must have some doubts as to its authenticity.  Defendants’ counsel went out on a limb
for Mr. Doig when they filed his alleged declaration, and surely they must want to know if their trust was misplaced.  
Plaintiff assumes that in the rush of daily business, Defendants’ counsel confused this case with a case in which they
had a legitimate reason to ask for a protective order.

II.  TWELVE CAUSES OF ACTION IN PLAINTIFF’S FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT ARE UNAFFECTED OR
POSITIVELY AFFECTED BY THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE
Defendants have listed five Appeals cases, Johnson, Westlake, Fresno, Logan, and Abelleira, which concern
Plaintiffs who filed suit as a result of a dismissal action.  This case law is inapplicable to most of Plaintiff’s Causes of
Action.

Plaintiff’s civil suit was not filed as a result of the District’s dismissal of Plaintiff.  The reverse is true.  The District
voted to dismiss Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff’s filing this lawsuit.  

Plaintiff incurred over $25,000 in damages long before the School Board voted on May 7, 2002 to dismiss her.
Conceivably, if the decision of the COMMISSION were not to be set aside, Plaintiff’s damages in this lawsuit would be
limited to the damages she suffered before May 7, 2002.  But that is the only negative effect that this decision would
have on Plaintiff’s FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH, NINTH, TENTH, THIRTEENTH, FOURTEENTH, FIFTEENTH,
SIXTEENTH, EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH causes of action.  

A total of twelve Causes of Action are unharmed by the COMMISSION’s decision.

III.  ONLY SEVEN CAUSES OF ACTION ARE NEGATIVELY AFFECTED BY THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION
Three Causes of Action would be negatively affected by the above-mentioned case law, and four would be negatively
affected by one of the COMMISSION’s findings, for a total of seven Causes of Action so affected, if the decision of the
COMMISSION were to be upheld.

The ELEVENTH, TWELFTH, and SEVENTEENTH Causes of Action, which were added as a result of the District’s
vote to dismiss Plaintiff, would be affected.  (The EIGHTEENTH would also be affected, but the effect would be
positive rather than negative, since the COMMISSION’s decision specifically states that Plaintiff is being dismissed
based on her filing of grievances, tort claims, and a lawsuit.  The COMMISSION’s decision also finds that Plaintiff filed
a charge with the Public Employment Relations Board, but does not specifically state that this was also a reason for
dismissing her.  Perhaps this was an oversight.  If not, it would be interesting to hear the COMMISSION’s reasoning
as to how a PERB charge differs from a grievance, tort claim, or lawsuit.)

The remaining four Causes of Action, the FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH AND EIGHTH, would be negatively affected if the
COMMISSION’s finding about Werlin’s story regarding March 27, 2001 were upheld.  Plaintiff is willing to forego
discovery on those causes of action until such time as the decision of the COMMISSION may be set aside.  
Of course, no Cause of Action will be affected by the decision of the COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL
COMPETENCE if Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Mandate to set aside the decision of the COMMISSION is granted.

IV.  CONTRARY TO THEIR CLAIM, DEFENDANTS HAVE PROCEEDED AGRESSIVELY WITH DISCOVERY SINCE
THEY WERE GRANTED A PROTECTIVE ORDER AGAINST DEPOSITIONS

In Exhibit B of Defendants’ Notice of Lodgment which accompanies this Motion for Protective Order, Kelly Angell
states, “You will notice that my office has refrained from pursuing any additional discovery from you during this time of
continued uncertainty with the pleadings.”  

A quick look through the file of this case will show that the District has vigorously proceeded with discovery since the
protective order against depositions was granted.  They have aggressively sought and been granted the right to
subpoena Plaintiff’s medical records.  

Yet Defendants now seek protection from having to turn over to Plaintiff her own employment records.  The right to
see one’s own employment records should not even require legal maneuvers in the first place.  It is outrageous that
Defendants’ insist that they may keep secret these documents, while insisting that Plaintiff has no right to the privacy
of her medical records.

V.  PLAINTIFF IS UNABLE TO FINALIZE THE PLEADINGS GIVEN THE EXTREME LACK OF COOPERATION OF
DEFENDANTS IN DISCOVERY.  

This case is clearly headed on a trajectory toward full revelation of the truth.  Defendants’ efforts to delay the
inevitable do not serve any good purpose.  Why not get all the facts out on the table, figure out how to deal with
them, and then get back to the business of educating students?

The discovery to which Defendants are objecting is Request for Production of Documents (Set One).  Defendants
have not produced a single document in this case.  How can this request be unduly burdensome?
Plaintiff requests that the Court deny Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order.

Given the fact that only three months remain before the three-year statute of limitations runs out on the civil tort of
illegally obtaining and publishing records of an arrest which did not lead to a conviction, Plaintiff also requests that
the Court lift the Protective Order against the taking of Depositions.  

Dated:  May 31, 2003                                                                
                         Maura Larkins, Plaintiff in pro per
CVESD and lawyers Shinoff, Morris and Angell
request protective order
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